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Abstract
This dissertation research focuses on the intersection of labor and sports economics. All three
chapters seek to answer or explore labor economics questions in the context of sports-related
data.
The first chapter addresses the substantial public debate regarding whether or not college
athletes—specifically basketball and football players—should be compensated above the value
of an athletic scholarship. In this paper, we estimate a panel data model with institution-level
fixed effects and find that the annual value of a premium college basketball player at a major
college program is approximately $380,000. These estimates are lower than those found in
the previous literature, where yearly values often exceeded $1 million. Furthermore, we find
that yearly changes in winning percentage have no effect on revenue at major programs which
limits the ability of non-premium players to significantly contribute to team revenue.
The second chapter examines strategic bargaining which is an important tool used in
business and employment settings. Participants in a bargaining situation can use a variety
of strategies to maximize contract value. In this paper, we analyze the effect of delaying
contractual agreement (or holding out) on NFL rookie contract values. Using an instrumental
variables approach, we find that a player who delays agreement and signs a contract after
the start of his team’s training camp receives an increase in total contract value of nearly
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$120,000, on average. We also find that this effect is substantially larger for players who are
selected in early rounds of the draft and sign larger contracts, increasing to an average effect
of around $430,000 for first round draft picks.
The third chapter studies the potential labor market impacts of sports teams and arenas.
As professional sports continue to grow in popularity, the teams involved are competing for
public funds in order to build the biggest and brightest stadiums and arenas. As this trend
continues it is increasingly important to quantify the labor market impacts of sports teams
and arenas to determine whether or not they are a sound public investment. This paper
expands on the current literature in two ways. First, by evaluating labor market effects at
a narrower geographic level (by ZIP code), the data allow for a more precise examination
of the potential for differing effects by proximity to the stadium/arena. Second, this paper
deviates from the previous literature by estimating the impact of sports arenas that do not
serve a major professional team, and instead focusing primarily on arenas that host minor
league hockey teams in the AHL and ECHL. The results mirror the previous literature in
that we fail to find any convincing evidence which supports the notion that construction of a
new sports arena improves local labor market conditions.
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Chapter 1
Is Exploitation Real? Estimating the
Marginal Revenue Product of Men’s
College Basketball Players Using Panel
Data
1.1 Introduction
The National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) and college athletic departments have
come under intense scrutiny in recent years over the potential exploitation of college athletes
as revenue producers instead of student-athletes. The NCAA prohibits paying college athletes,
aside from the value of an athletic scholarship, and places restrictions on players who transfer
between universities. These restrictions prevent universities from competing for athletes on a
price basis and reduce competition for college athletes. The NCAA has effectively made all
universities (within a single division) homogeneous buyers of student-athlete labor and has
provided the framework for universities to extract economic rents from premier athletes by
exploiting them on a wage basis.
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Since colleges essentially act as monopsony employers in the player recruitment market, it
is likely that players will not be paid their marginal revenue product. The economic rents
generated by universities also result in an incentive to cheat. Cheating in this case can be
monetary or non-monetary. universities could offer some form of compensation to premier
student-athletes above the maximum set by the NCAA. Over the years there have been
many instances of universities providing extra benefits to athletes (cash, gifts, apartments,
etc.), but perhaps the most famous example involved the football program at Southern
Methodist University (SMU). An investigation by the NCAA in 1985-86 revealed that SMU
had maintained a slush fund for “under the table” payments to players from the mid-1970s
through 1986. More recently, the University of Miami was caught in a major scandal in
which an athletic booster (and eventual convicted felon) was providing improper benefits to
at least 72 football and men’s basketball players from 2002-2010. We have also seen cases
of non-monetary cheating in the form of academic scandals where athletes get credit for
fake courses or have tutors completing coursework for them. The most recent (and most
well-known) of these cases has unfolded at the University of North Carolina where it was
found that hundreds of athletes over many years were steered into bogus courses where they
received high grades for doing little to no work.
To determine whether or not student-athletes are in fact being exploited, empirical
estimates are needed to approximate their marginal revenue product. While these estimates
will help to quantify how a college athlete’s play provides value to his university, there is still
much debate surrounding other aspects of student-athlete exploitation. In a July 2009 case,
Edward C. O’Bannon v. NCAA and Collegiate Licensing Company, Ed O’Bannon, a former
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basketball player for UCLA, filed a lawsuit against the NCAA, Electronic Arts, and the
Collegiate Licensing Company, alleging violations of the Sherman Antitrust Act and of actions
that deprived him of his right of publicity. The lawsuit, filed on behalf of the NCAA’s Division
I football and men’s basketball players, challenges the organization’s use of the images of
former student-athletes for commercial purposes. The suit argues that, upon graduation, a
former student-athlete should become entitled to financial compensation for the NCAA’s
commercial uses of his image. Initially, O’Bannon agreed to a settlement with Electronic Arts
and the Collegiate Licensing Company which could compensate college athletes for the use of
their likenesses in video games and retail sales (McCann, 2013). Following that settlement,
the courts ruled in favor of O’Bannon against the NCAA. As of this time, the ruling prevents
the NCAA from capping the amount of a scholarship below the actual cost of attendance,
and allows universities to create trust funds to pay student-athletes (upon graduation) equal
shares for the use of their likenesses. While the result of this lawsuit (and other pending legal
issues) is important to the general landscape of college basketball, this paper will focus on
estimating the value of a player’s on-court performance.
We attempt to build on the previous literature (described in detail in the following section)
by providing a more accurate measure of the marginal revenue product of a men’s college
basketball player. First, we use an expanded panel dataset which includes nearly all Division
I basketball programs observed over multiple years. Second, we control for time-invariant
unobserved factors which affect revenue by using a panel data model with institution-level
fixed effects. Third, we use a fixed-effects model to correct for potential endogeneity in the
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draft variable. Finally, we look at different methods to address and correct for the highly
skewed nature of revenues for Division I men’s basketball programs.
The main result we find is that a premium men’s college basketball player (one who
goes on to be drafted) is worth approximately $380,000 in annual revenue to his university.
The estimated value from our model is far lower than previous literature suggests, where
the annual value of a premium player was thought to be in excess of $1 million. Due to
the structure of our model, we are also able to determine that premium players provide
significant value only when they play for a college basketball program belonging to one of the
six major conferences (during the years studied: Big East, Big Ten, ACC, SEC, Big 12, Pac
10). Furthermore, we argue that non-premium players at major conference programs have
little ability to generate revenue by contributing to overall team success.
1.2 Literature Review
The idea of valuing athletes, amateur or professional, is not a new one. Scully (1974)
pioneered the initial method for estimating the marginal revenue product of athletes when he
evaluated the monopsonistic exploitation of major league baseball players. Scully’s method
distinguished individual player contributions to revenue through a two-equation model. The
first equation estimated team revenue as a function of the team’s win-loss record, controlling
for other revenue-influencing characteristics. The second equation was essentially a team
production function which related the team win-loss percentage to a number of measurable
player statistics. The principal assumption necessary to justify this approach is that fans
attend games (and therefore revenue is generated) to see teams win, not to witness individual
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statistical performances. Scully pointed out that it is impossible to ignore the fact that fans
are also drawn to sporting events to see superstar players. This methodology is harder to
justify when dealing with more “team-oriented” sports where cross-player effects are nearly
impossible to quantify.
Another branch of literature attempts to estimate the marginal revenue product of athletes
in a way which vastly differs from Scully’s original work in both methodology and justification.
Brown (1993, 1994) attempted to estimate player value in college football and basketball.
Instead of estimating the effect of individual statistical metrics on revenue like Scully, Brown
used the idea that a premium college athlete can be defined as one who is eventually drafted
into a professional sports league. Scully assumed that individual statistical performances in
baseball were separable and could be summed across the entire team, an assumption that is
not likely to be the case in such sports as football and basketball, which rely more heavily
on a team dynamic. Brown’s method estimated team revenue as a function of the total
number of players that are eventually drafted, while controlling for other revenue-generating
characteristics.
There are advantages and disadvantages to each of these approaches as they relate to
the goal of providing reliable estimates of player value in men’s college basketball. Scully’s
approach provides more flexibility in that we can determine the worth of any player based on
his specific statistical contributions during a season, which in turn allows us to create our
own definition as to who qualifies as an elite or premium player. Brown’s method requires us
to make fewer assumptions about how team performance relates to winning, but it eliminates
the flexibility provided by Scully. Under Brown’s approach, we are only able to estimate
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the value of a player who goes on to be drafted in the NBA, and we are forced to define a
premium player as such. However, much of the current debate about player exploitation in
fact surrounds those elite players who go on to play in the NBA, so Brown’s method will
serve as the basis for our analysis.
Brown (1994) presented the first empirical estimates of the marginal revenue product for a
premium Division I men’s college basketball player using data from the 1988-89 season. The
basic methodology regressed team revenues on the number of players drafted, controlling for
market characteristics and opponents’ team skill levels. This method provided an estimate
of the marginal revenue product generated from acquiring an additional premium college
basketball player. However, Brown also argued that the skill level of the players acquired
by a college team is likely endogenous to its recruiting effort; and since recruiting effort is
a function of a team’s market and recruiting characteristics, the number of players drafted
is likely correlated with the error term. To account for the endogeneity, Brown proposed a
two-stage estimation procedure. The first stage is a Poisson regression using the number of
drafted players as the dependent variable. In the second stage, team revenues are regressed on
the fitted values of the number of drafted players estimated in the first stage, controlling for
a team’s market characteristics and opponents’ team skill levels. One drawback to Brown’s
original work is that it uses a small sample of only 46 universities for which revenue data were
obtained. Brown finds that recruiting an additional player who goes on to be drafted into the
NBA is worth anywhere from $871,310 to $1,283,000 in annual revenue for his college team.
The range of estimates is due to different specifications used for the second stage estimates.
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Brown and Jewell (2004) provided an update of Brown (1994). The key change is the use
of a larger and more recent revenue data set. The data was collected by the Kansas City
Star in 1997, and provided revenue data from the 1995-96 season. Revenue information was
collected for 95 Division I basketball programs, more than doubling Brown’s original data
set. Using nearly identical estimation procedures, they found the marginal revenue product
of an additional player who goes on to be drafted into the NBA to be $1,194,469.
Brown and Jewell (2006) estimated the marginal revenue product of a women’s college
basketball player using revenue data from the 2000-01 season. The data were collected from
Equity in Athletics Disclosure Act1 forms reported in the Chronicle of Higher Education.
They found that a women’s college basketball player who goes on to be drafted into the
WNBA generated revenues of $241,337 for her college team. An important point made
in this paper, which reflects back on earlier estimates by Brown and Jewell, is that the
marginal revenue product estimates should be thought of as an upper bound since many
factors (coaching, facilities, etc.) which generate revenue are difficult to control for given
data constraints.
Lane et al. (2014) utilized updated versions of the Scully and Brown approaches to
estimate the marginal revenue product of men’s college basketball players. Using a modified
version of Scully’s original approach where they incorporate a distribution of professional
salaries to adjust for players with no performance data, they find about 60% of all men’s
college basketball players have a monetary contribution to the university that is greater than
1The Equity in Athletics Disclosure Act requires institutions of postsecondary education that participate
in federal student financial assistance programs to prepare an annual report to the Department of Education
on athletic participation, staffing, and revenues and expenses.
9
the value of a scholarship. Also, using an approach similar to Brown, they estimate that
nearly 100% of players who go on to be drafted contribute more revenue to their university
than the value of an athletic scholarship. Furthermore, universities’ “profit” from the star
players ranges from $7,000 to $1.8 million, with an average of about $400,000.
We attempt to overcome some of the data constraints of these prior studies by utilizing an
expanded panel data set. By using a panel data model with institution-level fixed effects, we
can control for the time-invariant factors which can also drive revenue for college basketball
programs. We also adjust for the extreme skewness in the revenue data, which could allow
outliers in the data to drive the estimates.
1.3 Data Description
In a similar fashion to Brown (1994) and Brown and Jewell (2004), we assume that a college
basketball team’s yearly revenue is a function of its players’ skill levels, coaching quality, the
quality of opponents being played, market demand characteristics, and past success. Our
sample uses data from the 2007-08, 2008-09, 2009-10, and 2010-11 seasons. Complete data
for 326 Division I men’s basketball teams were obtained, representing nearly all Division I
programs. Teams were included in the dataset only if they were full, non-provisional members
of Division I for the entire four-year period. Descriptive statistics for all data are found, by
year, in Tables A-1 to A-4. The various categories of data are described below.
Team revenue information was obtained from the Equity in Athletics Disclosure Act
(EADA) data provided by the U.S. Department of Education. The revenues include all
sources, such as ticket sales, TV and broadcast revenue, concessions, donations, etc. All
10
revenues are reported in thousands of dollars and have been adjusted to 2011 dollars using the
Consumer Price Index to allow for consistent comparison across years. While this is the only
comprehensive source of athletic revenue data available, it comes with certain limitations. The
aggregated revenues used include sources like student fees, government aid, and endowment
income which are likely invariant to current team performance or quality. To the extent
that these additional revenues cannot be captured by the institution-level fixed effects, our
estimates may overstate the value of current players.
We look at several measures of team and opponent quality. First, a simple winning
percentage (wins/games) can be used to measure team success in a given year. Second, we
use a dummy variable to control for whether or not a team is selected to participate in the
NCAA tournament in a given year. Third, we utilize the rating percentage index (RPI),
which measures team success along with the quality of opponents and which is commonly
used to rank men’s college basketball teams. The formula for determining the RPI is as
follows:
RPI = (Winning Percentage [WP]× 0.25) + (Opponents’ WP× 0.50)
+ (Opponents’ Opponents’ WP× 0.25).
For Division I men’s basketball, the WP factor included in RPI was changed in 2004 to
account for differences in home, away, and neutral site games. Instead of a traditional winning
percentage, the formula values home wins less and road wins more.2 In some specifications
2More specifically, in calculating the winning percentage, a home win now counts as 0.6 wins (instead of
1) and a road win counts as 1.4 wins.
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we also include a measure for strength of schedule (SOS). The SOS calculations are similar to
the RPI, but include no information about the team’s own performance. SOS is a weighted
average of the opponents’ winning percentage (2/3 weight) and the opponents’ opponents’
winning percentage (1/3 weight). Alternatively, the simple winning percentage can be used
along with SOS if we want to separate out the overall effects of RPI.
Premium players are defined as those who go on to be selected in the NBA draft. For
example, a team playing in the 2007-08 season could have players drafted in the 2008 draft,
but may also have players selected in the 2009-11 drafts. By accounting for four drafts
following each season under study, we account for all players who go on to be drafted from a
given team. For example, a freshman who plays during the 2007-08 season and stays in college
for four years would not enter the draft until 2011. An alternate definition of a premium
player is addressed in Section 1.4.3.
Along with player quality, we would also expect coaching quality to have an impact on
team success and revenue production. We control for the quality of the coach by looking
at the total years of experience of the head coach prior to the start of the season. We also
control for the coach’s overall winning percentage in all seasons prior to the season being
studied.
In order to measure past team success and popularity, we include an average weekly
ranking for a team over the three seasons prior to the season of study. The ranking assigns 25
points to a first-ranked team in a given week, 24 points to a second-ranked team, etc. These
weekly point values are averaged over the three-year period. For example, when using data
for the 2007-08 season, the average rank variable incorporates data from 2005-07. Since we
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do not want to make the assumption that the rank variable has a linear effect on revenue,
we map the rankings into five categorical variables. Rank1 represents universities which
were never ranked during the period. Rank2 includes universities with an average ranking
between 0 and 1 (meaning they were on the fringe of the rankings; for example, a team
that was ranked 25th over half the period and not ranked for the other half would have an
average ranking of 0.5). Rank3 includes universities with an average ranking between 1 and 5.
Rank4 includes universities with an average ranking of 5 to 10. Rank5 represents universities
with an average ranking greater than 10, meaning that over the three-year period they were
ranked in the top 15, on average. We chose to use the average ranking variable as a measure
of past success and popularity, but not when looking at current team quality (and instead
use RPI). The rankings are subjective in nature and do not necessarily reflect actual team
quality, especially early in seasons when few games have been played. However, in looking at
past success we are really trying to measure team popularity, which can lead to increased
revenue in future seasons. A team which is ranked highly in prior seasons is likely to pick up
additional fans and support, even if the ranking is not directly relatable to a measure such as
RPI.
Market demand characteristics are specified in two ways. First, we use the total student
population at each university, which provides a measure of the “captive” audience of potential
fans. Second, we use the state population as a broader measure of market potential. Previous
studies have used metropolitan statistical area (MSA) populations as another measure of
market demand. The use of MSAs creates an issue about how to assign universities to the
nearest MSA and has been shown to add little value in the form of explanatory power (Brown,
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1994; Brown and Jewell, 2004). For these reasons, we chose to exclude MSA population data
from our dataset.
We also account for the conference affiliation of each institution. The descriptive statistics
(Tables A-1 to A-4) provide information about the six major conferences (Pac 10, SEC, Big
12, ACC, Big East, Big 10), although we have conference data for all universities. The
period under study, 2007-11, is immediately prior to the recent shifts in conference alignment.
Since 2011, all six of the major conferences have undergone changes in membership, but
membership was consistent over the period being studied.
Table 1.1 provides a summary and description of the variables used throughout this paper,
as well as source information for all data.
1.4 Models and Results
We undertake multiple estimation procedures in this paper to estimate the value of a premium
college basketball player. First, we use our expanded panel data set to estimate a model with
institution-level fixed effects. Second, we estimate a log-transformed model to determine if
extreme skewness in the revenue data has an impact on the estimates.
1.4.1 Panel Data Model
By estimating a panel data model with institution-level fixed effects we are able to control
for unobserved, time-invariant factors which could affect a university’s revenue function, such
as facilities and institutional athletic tradition, among others. The basic model is as follows:
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Revenueit = αi + βDraftTotalit + γXit + τt + ϵit, (1.1)
where i = 1, ..., N denotes each institution in the sample and t = 1, .., 4 represents the
four seasons under study. In this model, αi represents the institution-level fixed effect and τt
denotes the time fixed effect. The variable of interest is the number of players who go on to
be drafted, DraftTotalit, and Xit includes time-varying covariates, such as state population,
student body size, coaching quality, NCAA tournament participation, RPI, SOS, winning
percentage, and average rank (as described in Section 1.3).
The use of the fixed-effects model can also help to correct the potential endogeneity
problem in the draft variable. We remain unconvinced that the method in Brown and Jewell
(2004) (which uses a team’s average ranking in previous seasons as an instrument) truly
corrects for the endogeneity of the draft variable, since a team’s ranking in previous years,
while often correlated with the ability to attract top players, is likely to also directly affect
current year revenue. While a strong correlation between premium players acquired and the
team’s average weekly ranking is an important factor in determining whether or not it is a
suitable instrument, it is not the only necessary condition. More importantly, the team’s
average ranking should have no direct effect on revenue to be a valid instrument, which is
unlikely in this case. Rather, it seems reasonable that ticket sales would be driven by a
team’s performance in previous years, which means that higher rankings would directly lead
to higher revenues, regardless of the variation in premium players.
Lane et al. (2014) use a two-stage model similar to Brown, and use a series of excluded
instruments to attempt to correct for potential endogeneity. The instruments include win-loss
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ratio, whether the team was a contender or loser in the previous season, and several statistical
measures of performance. Again, while we agree that these factors are likely to be correlated
with a university’s ability to attract premium players, it is also likely that some (or all) of
these factors also directly contribute to revenue earned. We choose to forego the two-stage
models used previously and rely on the strength of the panel data model to potentially
provide some relief for this issue. If we assume that the underlying characteristic driving the
endogeneity (recruiting effort) is constant over the four year panel, then it will be absorbed
by the institution-level fixed effect and will not bias our estimated coefficients. We argue that
over our relatively short panel length, teams are unlikely to drastically alter their recruiting
efforts (based on unobserved factors).
Several variations of the fixed-effects model were run (using different sample sizes) and
results can be found in Table 2. We show three specifications of the model using the full
sample of Division I programs (326), only those universities which also compete in the Football
Bowl Subdivision (FBS, 118), and only those belonging to one of the six major basketball
conferences (73). While in basketball there is no explicit distinction made amongst Division I
teams, we use the corresponding football team’s classification and/or membership in one of
the six major conferences as a proxy to classify men’s college basketball teams into major vs.
non-major programs. In general, universities which compete in the FBS or a major conference
have the largest and most well-funded athletic departments, the effects from which are likely
to carry over to basketball programs as well.
Table 1.2 shows that, regardless of specification, the estimated marginal revenue product
of a premium men’s college basketball player is statistically significant and ranges from about
16
$300,000 - $440,000. Interestingly, when we limit the sample to FBS programs or the six
major conferences, the measure of team and opponent quality (RPI) becomes insignificant.
This implies that controlling for a variable such as RPI is important in trying to distinguish
between the samples, but the coefficient becomes insignifcant when looking only at the major
programs. The coefficients on the time fixed effect show an interesting result in all samples.
Since the revenues have all been adjusted to constant 2011 dollars, the significant time effects
in the final two years (2009-10 and 2010-11) should not be related to inflation. In early
2010, the NCAA agreed to a new contract for the broadcast rights for the men’s basketball
tournament (Wolverton, 2010). The deal included an increase in the annual payout to college
teams as a result of the tournament, which could explain the significant increase in revenue
for the 2010-11 season. It is less clear as to why we see a significant increase in revenue for
the 2009-10 season.
It should come as no surprise that premium players at higher-revenue-producing universities
generate more value than players at universities which generate little revenue, but the question
is how much more. In order to get a better grasp of the difference between the samples, we
next run alternate versions of the model in which we introduce an interaction term:
Revenueit = αi + βDraftTotalit + δDraftTotalit ∗ FBSit + γXit + τt + ϵit, (1.2)
where i = 1, ..., N denotes each institution in the sample and t = 1, .., 4 represents the four
seasons under study. As before, αi represents the institution-level fixed effect and τt denotes
the time fixed effect. Similar to the previous model, the variable of interest is the number of
players who go on to be selected in the NBA draft, DraftTotalit. Additionally, we allow for an
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interaction term, DraftTotalit ∗ FBSit, where FBSit is a dummy variable equal to one if the
institution also plays major college football (we also do the same with an interaction denoting
that a team belongs to one of the six major conferences). This term allows us to separate out
the differing effects that premium players have on revenue at major vs. non-major college
basketball programs. As before, Xit includes time-varying covariates, such as state population,
student body size, coaching quality, RPI, SOS, winning percentage, and average rank. By
utilizing the interaction term, we are able to take advantage of the full sample size while still
distingushing between the value of players at major college programs vs. the remainder of
Division I programs (Table 1.3).
In a somewhat surprising result, players at non-major college programs provide no
significant value to their university in terms of increased revenue. In Table 1.3 [column (1)],
we see that the coefficient on DraftTotal is insignificant (-$47,000), while the coefficient on
the interaction term is significant ($439,000). Because the interaction term only applies to
players who play at FBS programs, our estimates therefore suggest that premium players
provide no significant value if they play for a non-major basketball program. For premium
players at FBS programs we must consider both terms discussed above. A player who goes
on to be drafted provides approximately $392,000 ($439,000-$47,000) of value to his team.
However, if we ignore the insignificant term, the value increases to nearly $440,000. We also
see that, once again, when using the full sample of universities the coefficient on RPI becomes
significant.
We find very similar results when using teams in the six major conferences as the
interaction instead of FBS programs. Table 1.3 [column (2)] shows that only players at
18
the major programs generate any significant value. In this case the estimates suggest that
premium players at a major program provide approximately $424,000 ($404,000+$20,000) of
value.
1.4.2 Panel Data Model Addressing Extreme Skewness in Revenues
The revenues of Division I college basketball programs are highly skewed with a small number
of teams earning massive revenues, while the majority of programs do not. Figure 1.1 shows
revenue for all observations in the sample (326 teams, 4 seasons per team), and the extreme
skewness is evident. Nearly 25% of all revenue observations fall at $1 million or lower, while
the highest single year revenue total exceeds $40 million. This skewness can have a large
impact empirically as we focus on estimating conditional mean values.
The previous research on this topic has largely ignored the issue, and we attempt to
address it here. The most common method for dealing with a highly right-skewed dependent
variable is to use a log-transformation. In our situation, the mechanics of the model remain
unchanged; we simply exchange the raw revenue values with logged values in the models we
used previously, and obtain the following results:
Table 1.4 shows the results from the log-transformed models (which mimic the results
shown in Tables 1.2 and 1.3). It becomes immediately evident that the skewness in revenue was
driving some of the significant results shown previously. After using the log-transformation,
the coefficient on the number of players drafted only remains significant in the iteration of the
model where we reduce the sample to only those universities in the largest six conferences. In
all other iterations (including those with interactions) none of the relevant coefficients remain
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significant. This leads to the conclusion that premium players only provide significant value
to their university when playing for a large, high-revenue-producing basketball program.
The complications from this approach arise when we attempt to interpret the results.
The coefficients produced from the new model can be interpreted directly as semi-elasticities,
which are of very little use in our context. We are concerned with finding a dollar value to
attribute to the marginal revenue product of men’s college basketball players. In order to
do this we must re-transform the dependent variable, and we use a method from the health
economics literature [see (Duan et al., 1983) and (Manning, 1998)].
Following (Duan et al., 1983), we use the “smearing factor” approach where the marginal
effect of having an additional player go on to be drafted is calculated by:
∂E(Y |X)
∂x
= ϕs exp(x
′β)β, (1.3)
where ϕs is the estimated sample average of the exponentiated residuals. This approach
is only valid under the assumption that homoskedasticity holds; however, we can allow for
heteroskedasticity by defining subgroups in the sample within which the error term has
constant variance and compute separate smearing factors for each subgroup. We calculate the
marginal effect under both assumptions, using conference affiliation to define the subgroups
in the case of heteroskedasticity.
Under the assumption of homoskedasticity we find the value of a premium player to be
$397,000, and under heteroskedasticity we find a value of $382,000. These results are very
similar to previous results found in Tables 1.2 and 1.3. We find that using the logged model
has very little impact on the previously estimated marginal effect for a premium player at a
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major conference university, but the adjustment has eliminated the significant results found in
the broader sample. One failure of this approach is that it ignores the potential contributions
of non-premium players, which we address in the following section.
1.4.3 Panel Data Model Addressing Non-Premium Players
The benefit of Scully’s original approach and additional work using similar methods is that it
allowed for the calculation of individual player contributions based on statistical performance.
In this section we consider a model where premium players contribute to revenue, but we
also examine whether the team’s overall performance has a concurrent impact (instead of
examining these effects separately, as has been done previously). Following closely from the
results of the previous section, we will focus the analysis on universities playing in one of the
six major conferences (where we have already shown premium players to have a significant
impact on revenue).
The modification to the model is simple. Instead of using RPI to capture both the
team’s own performance as well as the strength of its opponents, we use the team’s winning
percentage in a given season, along with the strength of their schedule, to examine the effects
independently. If winning percentage has a significant effect on revenue, then we must allow
for the possibility that non-premium players contribute to revenue through helping the team
succeed.
Table 1.5 [column (1)] shows the results of the model where we examine the simultaneous
impact of premium players and a team’s winning percentage on revenue. We see that the
coefficient estimate for drafted players is nearly identical to that of the previous model, and
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the coefficient on winning percentage is insignificant. The calculated marginal effect of an
additional premium player is nearly identical to the previous section, where the annual value
was found to be $380,000 under the assumption of heteroskedasticity.
An easy criticism of this result would be to argue that the effects of the two variables
of interest are conflating each other, causing the insignificance of winning percentage. As a
check of this concern we run the same regression and exclude the DraftTotal variable which
should, if anything, overvalue the impact of a team’s winning percentage on revenue. Table
1.5 [column (2)] shows these results, and we see that even when the number of drafted players
is excluded from the model, winning percentage still has no explanatory power in determining
revenue.
A possible explanation for this result relies on the fact that in this limited sample we
are mainly dealing with prominant universities, which have longstanding athletic histories
and traditions. In large part, these major programs derive revenue from relatively stable
sources like broadcast rights and donations. Furthermore, while changes in ticket sales can be
a large driver of revenue, many of these programs have such engrained fan bases that yearly
fluctuations in team performance will have little to no effect on attendance. The results
shown indicate that at major college basketball programs overall team performance does little
to move the revenue needle, while the addition of star players can still have some revenue
implications – most likely due to increased national attention and merchandise sales.
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A modified definition of premium players
Our methodology comprises a modest departure from the previous literature in the way in
which we define premium players. Brown and Jewell (2004) used only three years of draft
data when determining which players went on to be drafted into the NBA. This means that
a freshman player in a given season who was drafted following his senior year would not
be included as a premium player during estimation. Their justification was that any player
who was highly productive as a freshman would likely leave college early to enter the NBA
draft and therefore would still be included under this methodology. We decided to forego
this assumption knowing that some players, even highly productive ones, decide to stay in
college through their senior season. We therefore investigated whether or not the change in
methodology had any meaningful effect on our estimates. We redefine the draft total variable
in the same method as Brown, and re-run the preferred estimates (Table 1.4 [column (3)]).
We see that with this change the coefficient on the variable of interest is still significant and
has a value very similar to previous estimates. It does not appear as though the difference in
methodology has a large impact on the final results.
1.5 Discussion
While our estimates of marginal revenue product are informative on their own, it is useful
to frame them in terms of the current public debate on college athlete pay. We have shown
that premium men’s basketball players at major programs provide substantial value to their
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universities, but this is obviously not true for all players in all programs. A simple exercise
can be a useful tool in putting this value in perspective (see Table 1.7).
The NCAA allows Division I basketball programs to retain 13 full scholarship players
each year.3 Using our sample of 73 teams belonging to one of the six major conferences, this
means that there are approximately 949 players on scholarship in any given year at these
institutions. Next, consider the number of premium players (those who go on to be drafted
in the following year or another subsequent draft) on a college roster in a particular year. In
our data, this quantity is stable and averages about 141 players per season; however, when
considering only players on major conference teams, the average falls to 105 players per
season. This means that just over 11% of college players at major programs in a given season
will go on to be drafted (after the current season or in a future season). If we use our estimate
for the value of a premium player ($380,000) we find the total value of drafted players in
a given season at the 73 major programs is approximately $40 million. Conversely, we can
look at the total value provided to all players in the form of scholarships in a given year.
Using a median estimate for scholarship value ($27,923),4 we find that overall men’s college
basketball players (at those 73 universities) are provided with approximately $27 million in
scholarship value every year.
The previous example uses a median scholarship value to derive the value provided to
basketball players in a given year, but arguments have been made that the total value is
actually significantly higher. For example, a report released by USA Today estimates the
3The 13 scholarship limit for Division I men’s college basketball is current as of the 2013-14 NCAA Manual
- Bylaw 15.5.5.1.
4Median grant-in-aid based on Weiner and Berkowitz (2011).
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full value of an athletic scholarship to be $120,000 annually when including factors beyond
tuition and room and board – factors such as elite coaching, academic counseling, strength
and conditioning training, media relations assistance, etc. (Weiner and Berkowitz, 2011). If
this larger scholarship value were used in the above example, it would show that the benefits
provided to players would actually exceed the value provided to their institutions, in total.
We would expect these additional factors to be even more pronounced for players at major
conference programs as they get more exposure in the form of nationally televised games and
intense pro scouting. We show in Table 1.7 that if we assume the total annual value of a
scholarship is $50,000 or more (instead of $28,000), the value provided to all players begins
to exceed the value that premium players generate.
There are also arguments to be made that the true value of an athletic scholarship may
in fact be lower than previously discussed. The cost of a scholarship to the university is the
marginal cost of adding another student in class, which could range from zero to the full cost
of tuition depending on whether or not the scholarship athlete is replacing another student.
However, if we focus on the value of the scholarship to the athlete (not the cost to the
university), it makes sense to use the full tuition cost in this discussion. If a potential college
basketball player chooses to forego playing basketball and attend college anyway, they will
incur the full cost of tuition (not the marginal cost to the university of adding an additional
student). There are also counterpoints to the idea that the value of a scholarship may reach
as high as $120,000 in some cases. The main argument is that the additional factors that
increase a scholarship’s value only benefit athletes to the extent that they increase future
earnings. Therefore, these benefits are unlikely to provide significant value to college players
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who do not go on to play in the NBA. For this reason, we do not use the full $120,000 annual
value in our simple example, and instead present a scenario where the total scholarship value
is $50,000.
While this may be a simplified example, the intuition is straightforward. Instead of the
usual assumption that universities collect additional profit by extracting economic rents from
premium players, it may well be the case that universities extract rents in order to cover the
scholarship costs of non-premium players. If, in fact, the only players who generate value
for their university are those who go on to be drafted, then much of their value may simply
be redistributed amongst the team’s other players. This example only considers players and
teams which participate in one of the major six conferences, since most of the debate around
player compensation and exploitation focuses on players at major programs which bring in
significant annual revenue.
1.6 Conclusion
The goal of this paper was to review previous estimates of the marginal revenue product
of men’s college basketball players and attempt to improve upon that work using panel
data and different empirical methods. We have shown that some of the value previously
attributed to players is absorbed in a fixed-effect model, meaning that it is due to some
time-invariant institution-level effects. We argue that this is likely due to factors such as
historical athletic tradition, facilities, etc. that universities provide. We also show that the
inherent skewness in the revenue data could lead to spurious significant estimates for a larger
sample of universities if left uncorrected. Accounting for these factors, we estimate that the
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yearly value of a premium college player at a major conference university is approximately
$380,000, as opposed to previous estimates in excess of $1 million. Another interesting result
of our paper comes from the realization that revenue can be generated by different factors
simultaneously. By accounting for premium players and a team’s success at the same time, we
are able to account for the possibility that both star players and role players generate revenue
for a program through different channels. Our results show that a team’s winning percentage
in any given year has no effect on revenue given that it plays in a major conference. Therefore,
we conclude that only premium players are able to effect revenue at their universities in a
significant way.
A limitation we face in this study is related to the definition of a premium player. By
considering only those players who are eventually selected in the NBA draft (the highest
threshold of player quality) we only account for players with a high enough productivity
level to be drafted. It is possible that players who just miss out on being drafted are only
marginally less productive than those who are, meaning they could generate revenues very
close to the least productive drafted players. Unfortunately, we are unable to observe the
productivity level of undrafted players in this way. However, since much of the current debate
on this topic focuses on the potential exploitation of superstar college players, (and not of
their less-well-known teammates) we do not see this as a major drawback.
We use these estimates to make a case that major college basketball programs may not be
exploiting premium players for the reasons typically believed. Instead of extracting economic
rents to bolster athletic department profits, these universities may simply be using that extra
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value in order to cover the cost of scholarships to the non-premium players on the team.5
One concern with this rational is the fact that it seems clear that overall revenue in men’s
college basketball has increased substantially in recent years. Since the number of players
is generally fixed one would expect that the marginal revenue product of players should be
increasing as well. The easiest explanation of this phenomenon is that the additional revenues
accrued in recent years are unrelated to a team’s on-court performances. A main driver of the
revenue boom has been increasing rights fees for television broadcasts. The revenue derived
from these sources is consistent and will be largely unaffected by premium players and team
performance in any given season. Those particular revenue streams have more to do with
the overall popularity of the sport, which can be rooted in team (university) loyalty, and not
necessarily player driven productivity.
By no means do we expect that these new estimates will put an end to the debate
surrounding student-athlete compensation. However, we hope to narrow the debate by
providing more accurate estimates of the current value of men’s college basketball players.
5The model used in this paper can capture the value created by players directly for their universities, but
we do not address the issue at stake in the O’Bannon lawsuit, which remains a completely separate one. The
O’Bannon lawsuit argues that players are exploited by the NCAA when their likenesses and images are used
to sell merchandise, video games, etc.
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Fig. 1.1 Revenue Distribution for All Teams from 2008-2011
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Table 1.2 Fixed Effect Models Using Samples of Division I
Teams
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES Revenue Revenue Revenue
DraftTotal 305.4** 408.6** 441.2*
(132.8) (175.0) (238.8)
CoachExp 0.145 -3.041 3.810
(11.01) (20.18) (22.60)
CoachWinPct 65.62 247.7 631.3
(155.1) (365.5) (828.9)
Tournament -40.80 -114.1 -17.93
(98.61) (189.3) (186.7)
Rank2 114.6 -15.99 6.664
(138.5) (228.6) (304.6)
Rank3 426.8* 403.9 546.8
(231.7) (303.3) (384.3)
Rank4 140.4 45.79 112.0
(337.2) (317.6) (464.9)
Rank5 365.4* 169.3 188.2
(209.2) (144.2) (508.9)
StatePop -0.000173 -0.000384 -0.000677
(0.000120) (0.000254) (0.000613)
RPI 810.9*** 492.1 -1,110
(294.2) (926.1) (1,773)
2008-09 Season 58.57 3.550 -69.09
(54.90) (129.2) (176.1)
2009-10 Season 455.7*** 750.6*** 1,163***
(102.7) (182.7) (236.9)
2010-11 Season 407.8*** 634.5** 951.5**
(121.6) (257.8) (425.6)
Constant 4,313*** 9,122** 15,360**
(1,426) (3,256) (6,770)
Observations 1,304 471 292
R-squared 0.093 0.129 0.174
Number of teams 326 118 73
Notes: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Standard
errors clustered at the conference level in parentheses. In
the full sample model, there are 32 clusters used to calculate
the standard errors. All revenues are reported in thousands
($000s).
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Table 1.3 Fixed Effect Models Using Interaction Terms
(1) (2)
VARIABLES Revenue Revenue
DraftTotal -47.25 19.78
(122.8) (104.4)
DraftTotal*FBS 439.0**
(186.0)
DraftTotal*Big6 403.6**
(192.7)
CoachExp -1.665 -0.497
(11.15) (11.35)
CoachWinPct 127.5 116.5
(148.7) (144.5)
Tournament -49.53 -44.85
(100.4) (101.7)
Rank2 76.37 98.80
(142.6) (135.8)
Rank3 401.0* 444.9*
(235.3) (238.0)
Rank4 174.6 185.4
(345.4) (359.7)
Rank5 208.2 425.1*
(229.8) (229.0)
StatePop -0.000172 -0.000155
(0.000120) (0.000116)
RPI 894.8*** 914.9***
(306.8) (304.2)
2008-09 Season 64.66 57.73
(55.99) (58.21)
2009-10 Season 458.8*** 451.8***
(102.4) (103.6)
2010-11 Season 414.5*** 400.6***
(120.3) (123.0)
Constant 4,250*** 4,058***
(1,428) (1,404)
Observations 1,304 1,304
R-squared 0.100 0.100
Number of teams 326 326
Notes: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Standard errors clustered at the
conference level in parentheses. In the full sample model, there are 32 clusters used
to calculate the standard errors. All revenues are reported in thousands ($000s).
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Table 1.4 Fixed Effect Models Using Logged Dependent Variable
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES ln(Revenue) ln(Revenue) ln(Revenue) ln(Revenue) ln(Revenue)
DraftTotal 0.00875 0.0208 0.0276** -0.0283 -0.0250
(0.0176) (0.0128) (0.0133) (0.0588) (0.0453)
DraftTotal*FBS 0.0461
(0.0581)
DraftTotal*Big6 0.0477
(0.0453)
CoachExp 0.000526 0.000236 0.00175 0.000335 0.000449
(0.00219) (0.00244) (0.00213) (0.00220) (0.00219)
CoachWinPct -0.0760 -0.0308 0.0490 -0.0695 -0.0700
(0.0519) (0.101) (0.107) (0.0509) (0.0492)
Tournament 0.0196 -0.0272 -0.00146 0.0187 0.0191
(0.0310) (0.0260) (0.0212) (0.0300) (0.0306)
Rank2 0.0135 -0.00893 0.00851 0.00951 0.0117
(0.0222) (0.0363) (0.0345) (0.0219) (0.0216)
Rank3 0.0738** 0.0682 0.0759* 0.0711** 0.0760**
(0.0280) (0.0389) (0.0436) (0.0284) (0.0296)
Rank4 0.0838** 0.0542 0.0357 0.0874** 0.0891**
(0.0377) (0.0370) (0.0500) (0.0385) (0.0402)
Rank5 0.0692* 0.0526 0.0473 0.0527 0.0763**
(0.0405) (0.0361) (0.0570) (0.0494) (0.0370)
StatePop 7.11e-08 -1.23e-08 -7.72e-08 7.13e-08 7.33e-08
(4.43e-08) (8.42e-08) (6.59e-08) (4.49e-08) (4.46e-08)
RPI 0.372*** 0.397* -0.0196 0.381*** 0.384***
(0.128) (0.191) (0.169) (0.127) (0.129)
2008-09 Season 0.0556*** 0.0128 0.00302 0.0562*** 0.0555***
(0.0189) (0.0172) (0.0157) (0.0195) (0.0193)
2009-10 Season 0.149*** 0.140*** 0.121*** 0.149*** 0.148***
(0.0228) (0.0326) (0.0255) (0.0230) (0.0228)
2010-11 Season 0.152*** 0.123*** 0.0847*** 0.153*** 0.152***
(0.0252) (0.0369) (0.0306) (0.0255) (0.0253)
Constant 6.625*** 8.283*** 9.591*** 6.619*** 6.595***
(0.475) (0.885) (0.686) (0.482) (0.482)
Observations 1,304 471 292 1,304 1,304
R-squared 0.127 0.121 0.225 0.128 0.129
Number of teams 326 118 73 326 326
Notes: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Standard errors clustered at the conference level in
parentheses. In the full sample model, there are 32 clusters used to calculate the standard errors.
All revenues are reported in thousands ($000s).
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Table 1.5 Model Allowing for Contributions of
Non-Premium Players
(1) (3)
VARIABLES ln(Revenue) ln(Revenue)
DraftTotal 0.0272*
(0.0137)
WinPct -0.00675 0.0200
(0.0593) (0.0629)
CoachExp 0.00175 0.00239
(0.00208) (0.00201)
CoachWinPct 0.0473 0.0234
(0.108) (0.108)
Tournament -0.000791 0.00485
(0.0229) (0.0233)
SOS -0.175 -0.321
(0.483) (0.454)
Rank2 0.00866 0.00712
(0.0350) (0.0360)
Rank3 0.0772* 0.0732*
(0.0438) (0.0435)
Rank4 0.0380 0.0329
(0.0505) (0.0496)
Rank5 0.0491 0.0410
(0.0577) (0.0603)
StatePop -7.78e-08 -7.95e-08
(6.68e-08) (7.41e-08)
2008-09 Season 0.00235 0.00351
(0.0151) (0.0148)
2009-10 Season 0.121*** 0.123***
(0.0253) (0.0249)
2010-11 Season 0.0848*** 0.0861***
(0.0306) (0.0310)
Constant 9.694*** 9.858***
(0.805) (0.866)
Observations 292 292
R-squared 0.226 0.205
Number of teams 73 73
Notes: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Ro-
bust standard errors in parentheses. All revenues
are reported in thousands ($000s).
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Table 1.6 Modified Estimates Us-
ing 3 Years of Draft Data
VARIABLES ln(Revenue)
DraftTotal 0.022*
(0.012)
Observations 292
Number of teams 73
R-squared 0.215
Notes: *** p < 0.01, ** p <
0.05, * p < 0.1. Robust standard
errors in parentheses. All rev-
enues are reported in thousands
($000s).
Table 1.7 Example of Overall Player Valuation
Number of scholarships allowed per team (Division I) 13
Number of Big Six conference teams 73
Total scholarship players per season (on 73 teams) 949
Avg. number of premium players per year on those teams 105
Percentage of players drafted (from Big Six teams) 11.1%
Total value of drafted players, based on our estimates ≈ $40 million
Total value of scholarships given to all Big Six players ≈ $27 million
(assuming a yearly scholarship value of $27,923)
Total value of scholarships given to all Big Six players ≈ $47 million
(assuming a yearly scholarship value of $50,000)
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Table A-1 Descriptive Statistics for 2007-08 Season
Full Sample (N=326) FBS (N=117)
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Revenue ($000s) 3,345.8 4,174.1 214.4 26,000.2 6,519.7 5,309.1 347.0 26,000.2
Quality of Team:
Winning Percentage 0.510 0.174 0.100 0.950 0.558 0.176 0.100 0.950
Ratings Percentage Index 0.500 0.068 0.346 0.676 0.537 0.064 0.387 0.676
Strength of Schedule 0.499 0.049 0.400 0.620 0.540 0.038 0.446 0.620
Avg. Rank (2005-07) 0.992 2.937 0.000 19.202 2.459 4.356 0.000 19.202
NCAA Tournament 0.199 0.400 0.00 1.00 0.316 0.467 0.00 1.00
Premium Players 0.429 0.908 0.000 6.000 0.983 1.239 0.000 6.000
Market Characteristics:
Full-time Students 11,182 7,882 1,341 36,835 17,450 7,965 2,812 36,835
State Population (000s) 10,800 9,343 535 36,300 10,400 9,178 535 36,300
Coaching Quality:
Years of Experience 9.60 8.12 0.00 41 11.14 8.99 0.00 41
Career Winning Percentage 0.503 0.181 0.00 0.818 0.566 0.163 0.00 0.818
Conference Affiliation:
Pac 10 0.03 0.17 0.00 1.00 0.09 0.28 0.00 1.00
SEC 0.04 0.19 0.00 1.00 0.10 0.30 0.00 1.00
Big 12 0.04 0.19 0.00 1.00 0.10 0.30 0.00 1.00
ACC 0.04 0.19 0.00 1.00 0.10 0.30 0.00 1.00
Big East 0.05 0.22 0.00 1.00 0.08 0.27 0.00 1.00
Big 10 0.03 0.18 0.00 1.00 0.09 0.29 0.00 1.00
Table A-2 Descriptive Statistics for 2008-09 Season
Full Sample (N=326) FBS (N=118)
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Revenue ($000s) 3,390.2 4,078.9 241.3 26,514.7 6,414.3 5,201.8 320.5 26,514.7
Quality of Team:
Winning Percentage 0.512 0.171 0.069 0.895 0.536 0.166 0.069 0.861
Ratings Percentage Index 0.500 0.069 0.340 0.668 0.519 0.071 0.352 0.668
Strength of Schedule 0.500 0.045 0.393 0.604 0.536 0.034 0.465 0.604
Avg. Rank (2006-08) 0.992 3.028 0.000 19.200 2.306 4.463 0.000 19.200
NCAA Tournament 0.196 0.398 0.00 1.00 0.347 0.478 0.00 1.00
Premium Players 0.439 0.964 0.000 6.000 0.958 1.323 0.000 6.000
Market Characteristics:
Full-time Students 11,068 7,869 1,404 43,026 17,194 8,085 2,847 43,026
State Population (000s) 10,900 9,445 546 36,600 10,500 9,270 546 36,600
Coaching Quality:
Years of Experience 10.04 8.15 0.00 36 11.22 8.80 0.00 36
Career Winning Percentage 0.520 0.165 0.00 0.882 0.564 0.162 0.00 0.807
Conference Affiliation:
Pac 10 0.03 0.17 0.00 1.00 0.08 0.28 0.00 1.00
SEC 0.04 0.19 0.00 1.00 0.10 0.30 0.00 1.00
Big 12 0.04 0.19 0.00 1.00 0.10 0.30 0.00 1.00
ACC 0.04 0.19 0.00 1.00 0.10 0.30 0.00 1.00
Big East 0.05 0.22 0.00 1.00 0.08 0.27 0.00 1.00
Big 10 0.03 0.18 0.00 1.00 0.09 0.29 0.00 1.00
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Table A-3 Descriptive Statistics for 2009-10 Season
Full Sample (N=326) FBS (N=118)
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Revenue ($000s) 3,772.0 4,609.3 221.5 28,000.4 7,136.6 5,863.7 398.7 28,000.4
Quality of Team:
Winning Percentage 0.519 0.176 0.033 0.921 0.577 0.159 0.125 0.921
Ratings Percentage Index 0.504 0.068 0.349 0.679 0.543 0.060 0.398 0.679
Strength of Schedule 0.501 0.048 0.393 0.609 0.539 0.040 0.424 0.609
Avg. Rank (2007-09) 0.992 3.105 0.000 23.400 2.318 4.584 0.000 23.400
NCAA Tournament 0.196 0.398 0.00 1.00 0.339 0.475 0.00 1.00
Premium Players 0.426 0.976 0.000 8.000 0.958 1.374 0.000 8.000
Market Characteristics:
Full-time Students 11,332 8,019 1,451 45,490 17,532 8,239 2,911 45,490
State Population (000s) 11,000 9,552 560 37,000 10,600 9,387 560 37,000
Coaching Quality:
Years of Experience 10.39 8.25 0.00 37 11.69 8.81 0.00 37
Career Winning Percentage 0.513 0.166 0.00 0.848 0.570 0.152 0.00 0.811
Conference Affiliation:
Pac 10 0.03 0.17 0.00 1.00 0.08 0.28 0.00 1.00
SEC 0.04 0.19 0.00 1.00 0.10 0.30 0.00 1.00
Big 12 0.04 0.19 0.00 1.00 0.10 0.30 0.00 1.00
ACC 0.04 0.19 0.00 1.00 0.10 0.30 0.00 1.00
Big East 0.05 0.22 0.00 1.00 0.08 0.27 0.00 1.00
Big 10 0.03 0.18 0.00 1.00 0.09 0.29 0.00 1.00
Table A-4 Descriptive Statistics for 2010-11 Season
Full Sample (N=326) FBS (N=118)
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Revenue ($000s) 3,709.6 4,709.8 346.9 40,887.9 6,989.8 6,225.6 461.7 40,887.9
Quality of Team:
Winning Percentage 0.514 0.172 0.125 0.921 0.576 0.162 0.125 0.921
Ratings Percentage Index 0.502 0.068 0.345 0.671 0.541 0.064 0.373 0.671
Strength of Schedule 0.502 0.048 0.389 0.620 0.539 0.037 0.418 0.609
Avg. Rank (2008-10) 0.997 3.063 0.000 19.400 2.293 4.424 0.000 19.400
NCAA Tournament 0.209 0.407 0.00 1.00 0.347 0.478 0.00 1.00
Premium Players 0.362 0.917 0.000 7.000 0.805 1.335 0.000 7.000
Market Characteristics:
Full-time Students 11,538 8,123 1,510 46,894 17,844 8,269 2,943 46,894
State Population (000s) 11,100 9,663 565 37,300 10,700 9,507 565 37,300
Coaching Quality:
Years of Experience 10.44 8.40 0.00 38 12.03 8.59 0.00 38
Career Winning Percentage 0.507 0.176 0.00 0.856 0.584 0.136 0.00 0.798
Conference Affiliation:
Pac 10 0.03 0.17 0.00 1.00 0.08 0.28 0.00 1.00
SEC 0.04 0.19 0.00 1.00 0.10 0.30 0.00 1.00
Big 12 0.04 0.19 0.00 1.00 0.10 0.30 0.00 1.00
ACC 0.04 0.19 0.00 1.00 0.10 0.30 0.00 1.00
Big East 0.05 0.22 0.00 1.00 0.08 0.27 0.00 1.00
Big 10 0.03 0.18 0.00 1.00 0.09 0.29 0.00 1.00
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Chapter 2
Do Holdouts Pay? Estimating the
Impact of Delayed Contractual
Agreement on NFL Rookie Contract
Values
2.1 Introduction
Contract negotiations and strategic bargaining play a pivotal role in business decisions
worldwide. Some of the most well-known and highly publicized of these negotiations take
place frequently in professional sports leagues. Among them, the National Football League
(NFL) often has the most high-profile, prolonged contract disputes in part due to the fact
that players sign non-guaranteed contracts. The nature of these contracts often causes players
to try to get larger initial contract values, or attempt to renegotiate a new contract before
their current one ends.
While strategic negotiations happen amongst all variety of players in the NFL, up until
recently some of the best known instances of delayed contract agreement occurred with newly
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drafted NFL players trying to come to terms on their first contract.1 A common negotiating
tactic used in these scenarios was for a player to “hold out” or refuse to sign a contract, and
thereby refuse to participate in team activities, in an attempt to receive a better offer. In
these cases, both sides have leverage in negotiation. The team owns the rights to the player
after drafting them, so if the player refuses to sign a contract they will not be able to play in
the NFL at all that season. The player holds power because (presumably) the team wants
the player to contribute on the field and there may be pressure from fans who want to see a
highly touted new player participating. The question which remains, and that we will answer,
is whether or not the player yields enough leverage in negotiation in order for the holdout
strategy to be successful.
The collective bargaining agreement (CBA) agreed to by the NFL and the NFL Players
Association (NFLPA) dictates the terms and conditions under which NFL teams and players
are allowed to negotiate and come to terms on contracts. After a series of legal battles
between the NFL and NFLPA in the early 1990s, a new collective bargaining agreement was
reached in 1993 which allowed for more open free agency and the implementation of a salary
cap or a limit on the total amount of money a team can spend on player salaries.2 That CBA
was extended several times and continued through the period under study (2001-07). Article
XVII of the CBA addressed contract controls for rookies, in part, by setting up the “Entering
Player Pool.”3 This pool served as a league-wide limit on the total amount of salary NFL
1JaMarcus Russell was selected by the Oakland Raiders with the first overall pick in the 2007 draft.
Contract negotiations stalled and Russell missed all of training camp, not signing a contract until the season
had already started (Pasquarelli, 2007).
2Based on ESPN’s recording of NFL labor history: http://sports.espn.go.com/nfl/news/story?
page=nfl_labor_history
3A copy of the CBA which was effective beginning in 2006 can be found at: http://static.nfl.com/
static/content/public/image/cba/nfl-cba-2006-2012.pdf
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teams could use in signing newly drafted players. Each team received an allocation from
the pool which was calculated based on the number, round, and position of the team’s picks
in the draft. The CBA did not dictate how this allocation was to be divided amongst all
of a team’s draft picks, and it also only controlled the amount of money allotted to rookie
contracts in the first year. This allowed for loopholes in which teams could manipulate their
allocation using creative signing bonus payouts. These facts led to increasing salaries for
players at the top of the draft, which provided a strong incentive for players to hold out or
delay contractual agreement in order to continue getting a bigger piece of the pie.
All of this changed with the formation of a new collective bargaining agreement in 2011,
which came into existence after a months-long player lockout shut down league operations.
There were many topics at issue during the negotiation for a new CBA, including the salary
cap, player safety, revenue sharing, and, most importantly for this paper, rookie salaries. In
the years leading up to the lockout and eventual agreement on a new CBA, the salaries for
top draft picks had started to grow rapidly and out of proportion to the extent that highly
drafted rookies were signing larger contracts than established, successful players. As part of
the new CBA,4 the NFLPA agreed to a rookie wage scale which laid out specific contract
values based on when a player is selected in the draft. In an instant, newly drafted players
had essentially lost their ability to hold out in the hopes of receiving a better contract offer.
Even still, the question remains, did player holdouts actually work to systematically increase
contract values? While this exact scenario no longer plays itself out every summer following
the NFL draft, the wealth of information available regarding the outcome of player contract
4A copy of the CBA which went into effect in 2011 can be found at: https://nfllabor.files.wordpress.
com/2010/01/collective-bargaining-agreement-2011-2020.pdf
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negotiations still makes it relevant in the broader context of strategic bargaining between two
parties. Also, while rookie NFL players no longer have the ability to hold out, this strategy
is still used by veteran players in the NFL looking for improved contract terms.5
Strategic bargaining remains prominent in many business and employment settings,
whether it be a labor union bargaining over new contract terms with management or recent
college graduates negotiating their first employment contract. In this paper we set out to
develop the first causal estimates of the effect of a contract holdout on the value of an NFL
rookie contract. Using an instrumental variables model we find that a player who delays
contractual agreement, and signs a contract after the start of his team’s training camp,
receives an increase in total contract value of nearly $120,000, on average. We also find that
this effect is substantially larger for players who are selected in early rounds of the draft,
increasing to an average effect of around $430,000 for players selected in the first round.
Lastly, we evaluate the impact that holdout duration has on a player’s total contract value.
Using the distribution of player holdout lengths we find that for each additional day a player
delays agreement, total contract value increases by approximately $10,000, on average.
The next section discusses some of the relevant theoretical and empirical research on
the topic of strategic bargaining, focusing specifically on the tactic of delaying contractual
agreement. In Section 2.3 we describe the data used for our empirical analysis. Section 2.4
outlines a preliminary model to estimate the effect of a contract holdout. Section 2.5 discusses
the potential endogeneity problems in the model and addresses the need for instrumental
5Two recent examples involve the Seattle Seahawks. In 2014, running back Marshawn Lynch did not
report to training camp on time in the hopes of agreeing to a new, larger contract (Breech, 2014). In 2015,
safety Kam Chancellor went so far as to miss all of training camp along with two regular season games in an
attempt to get more money (Brinson, 2015).
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variables estimation. Section 2.6 discusses the results of the instrumental variables model
and presents a simulation exercise. In Section 2.7 we conduct robustness checks related to
our choice of an instrumental variable.
2.2 Background & Conceptual Model
A wealth of research exists which is broadly related to strategic negotiation and bargaining,
as well as some specifically dealing with NFL contracts.6 A sampling of the relevant work
that forms a basis for this paper is discussed below as we examine literature dealing with the
timing of offers, private information, and specifically with NFL contracts.
Admati and Perry (1987) study a variation on the standard alternating offers bargaining
model. Using the model they show that endogenous time between offers can be an important
strategic variable in bargaining with incomplete information. In characterizing the equilibrium
outcomes of the game they show that endogenous time between offers will be used in
equilibrium by players to signal their relative strength, which may then cause a delay in
reaching agreement. Also, the delay does not vanish as the minimal time between offers
becomes arbitrarily small. Their results also support the casual observation that, in many
bargaining situations, some delay between offers exists. The idea that a player in a bargaining
situation delays agreement in order to signal their relative strength reinforces later, NFL
specific, work in Conlin (1999).
6See Roth and Murnighan (1982), Samuelson (1984), and Roth et al. (1988) for a primer on the roles that
information and deadlines play in bargaining models.
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Ma and Manove (1993) note that anecdotal and experimental evidence suggests that
parties who engage in bargaining under a deadline exhibit a complex behavioral pattern,
and not only are delays in agreement common, but parties may fail to reach an agreement
before the deadline. Another observation is that cheap talk and stalling are frequently seen
in the early stages of negotiations. In this paper, they construct a complete-information
model with an equilibrium that reflects the following stylized facts: initial delay, moderate
offers, rejected offers, agreement near the deadline, and some failures in reaching agreement.
In order to obtain these equilibria they add two additional features to the finite-horizon
bargaining model: strategic delay and imperfect player control over the timing of offers during
the bargaining session. The premise of bargaining under a deadline fits nicely in the context
of NFL contract negotiations where we examine whether players reach agreement prior to
the start of training camp, which serves as the deadline. The results of this model in which
agreements either happen near the deadline or fail to be made mirror what we see in the
contract data being studied.
Forsythe et al. (1991) conduct an experimental study of two-player pie-splitting games in
which one player has private information about the size of the pie. The bargaining in the
experiment occurs under a deadline where failure to reach agreement results in both sides
getting nothing. Even operating under this severe penalty (which is much harsher than failing
to reach agreement in our case) they observe some games resulting in “strikes” or failures to
reach agreement.
Kennan and Wilson (1993) also examine the outcome of bargaining games with private
information. They review theoretical and empirical studies of bargaining and conclude that
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delays and other costly actions may be required to convey private information credibly, as
they provide convincing evidence. Further, they find that in economic transactions, inefficient
delays in agreement can occur due to the informed party’s attempt to signal. The idea that a
player with private information may use delayed agreement as a signal in negotiation forms a
basis for our model.
Conlin (1999) provides the foundation for the empirical analysis found in this paper. He
develops a conceptual model for a separating equilibrium in the bargaining of NFL contracts.
The basis of the model is that while there is substantial public information available about
players at the time of the NFL draft, players may still maintain some private information
about their ability, skill level, or risk preferences. This private information can be either
positive (perhaps the player knows they did not perform to their abilities in workouts) or
negative (a player could have an undisclosed injury). The separating equilibrium predicts that
a player who delays contractual agreement signs a more lucrative contract and has private
information on his ability level at the time of contract negotiations. The empirical results
support the implications of the separating equilibrium. Using contract data for 1,873 players
selected in the 1986-1991 drafts, the empirical results show that players of high ability levels
sign after longer contract negotiations and that players who delay contractual agreement sign
more lucrative contracts.
There are several empirical issues with the analysis in Conlin (1999) that we address in
this paper. First, we attempt to correct for the endogeneity in the decision to hold out. It
seems likely that there are unobserved factors which affect the decision for a player to hold
out, as well as the eventual contract value. We implement an instrumental variables regression
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to correct for this problem, which allows us to calculate causal estimates of the monetary
value of delaying contractual agreement in NFL contract negotiations. We also address the
fact that rookie contract values are highly right-skewed which can distort regression results
when estimating conditional means.
2.3 Contract Values & Empirical Characteristics
The data used for our analysis originates from contracts signed by newly drafted players
in the 2001-2007 seasons. Teams are awarded one draft pick in each of seven rounds in
the current draft format with the possibility of extra compensatory picks being awarded.7
Information is available for 1,776 contracts that were agreed to, and had details reported to
the NFLPA, during the period of study between rookie players and one of the 32 NFL teams
(31 in 2001).8 Table 2.1 presents descriptive statistics for the relevant variables in the dataset.
The dataset provides information on the length of contract signed, base salaries in each
contract year, and the signing bonus paid. From these values, we calculate two dependent
variables that are used in our analysis. First, total contract value is simply the sum of all
base year salaries plus the signing bonus. Second, we calculate an average prorated value as
the total contract value divided by the length of the contract such that the signing bonus
is divided over the life of the contract. In both cases, all contract amounts are converted
7The NFL can assign as many as 32 compensatory draft picks based on the number and value of free agents
lost by each team. The picks are assigned at the ends of rounds 3-7 and are determined by a proprietary formula
developed by the NFL Management Council: http://operations.nfl.com/the-players/the-nfl-draft/
the-rules-of-the-draft/.
8We are grateful to Michael Conlin for providing the data, which was originally furnished by the NFLPA.
The data provided includes information on contract terms, players, agents, and teams. We added state-level
characteristics to the existing data. All data used are described in detail throughout the paper.
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into constant 2007 dollars, and then any future base salaries are discounted to develop a
net present value.9 Figures 2.1 and 2.2 show that, regardless of which measure we use, the
contract values are right-skewed. This is due to the fact that high draft picks sign lucrative
contracts and then there is a sharp drop-off for contracts of lower selections in the draft.
In the case of NFL rookie contracts, we can define holdouts in a specific way. After a player
is selected in the NFL draft (typically held in late April for the period under study), he begins
negotiating a contract with the selecting team. The player is typically represented by an
agent during this process who negotiates on his behalf. Ideally, players come to an agreement
at some point between the draft and the start of the team’s training camp. Training camp is
the first mandatory team activity leading up to the regular season, and typically begins in
late July or early August. We define a holdout as a situation where a player fails to sign
a contract before the start of training camp. The duration of a holdout can be calculated
by setting the training camp start date for a given team as the zero point. Any player who
signs prior to the start of training camp will have a negative holdout duration describing
how many days early he signed, while a player who signs after the start of camp will have a
positive holdout duration which describes the number of days after training camp began that
the contract was signed.
In one model specification we define a holdout dummy variable which is equal to one for
any player who signs a contract after the start of training camp and zero otherwise. Figure
2.3 shows the distribution of time over which players sign their contracts. It becomes clear
9Net present values are calculated using the 3-year, constant maturity U.S. Treasury securities rate for the
year in which the contract was signed as the discount rate. The results given throughout the paper are not
materially different than the results obtained either by using a constant five percent discount rate or without
using a net present value calculation for contract values.
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that a majority of players sign contracts in the days leading up to the start of training camp.
In addition, there are players who fail to meet the deadline and do not agree to a contract
until after training camp has started (this type of result was suggested by the experimental
evidence in Ma and Manove (1993)).
In a second model specification we account for the duration of a holdout by defining a
left-censored version of the holdout variable (Figure 2.4). In this variation all players who
sign a contract prior to the start of training camp are assigned a zero value, and those who
delay agreement are assigned a value equal to the duration of the holdout, in days. The
justification for using a left-censored variable instead of the entire continuous distribution of
player signings (both positive and negative) stems from the underlying model assumptions.
In Conlin (1999), the model that is developed assumes that players choose to hold out as a
signal that they have some type of positive, private information. The reasons why players
sign well in advance of the training camp deadline are less clear. Oftentimes signing early
could be for reasons unrelated to contract negotiation and maximizing contract values. In
some cases first overall picks sign early because they were already negotiating a contract prior
to the draft. In other cases players may sign quickly due to extreme risk aversion. In any
case, since the reasons are not clear, we censor those observations (and give them all a value
of 0).
2.4 Ordinary Least Squares Model & Results
We specify a model intended to test whether or not delaying contractual agreement does
indeed lead to more lucrative contract terms. Our dependent variable (Yi,n) takes several
47
forms as we try to account for different measures of contract value. As discussed in the
previous section, the different contract measures include the total contract value and the
average prorated value. Regardless of which measure of contract value is being studied, we
use a log transformation to account for the right-skewed distribution:
ln(Yi,n) = αHoldouti + β(Pi, Ai, Tn, Sn) + τt + ηn + ui, (2.1)
where Yi,n represents the value of a contract agreed to between player, i, and team, n. In
addition Holdouti represents the holdout dummy variable and Pi, Ai, Tn, Sn are the control
variables related to the player, agent, team, and state, respectively. Also, τt represents time
fixed effects and ηn represents team fixed effects.
Contract values are determined by several factors relating to: the player; the agent who
negotiates the contract; the team that signs the player; and the state where the team is
located. First, we must control for the ability and skill level of the player being drafted
(Pi). The results of the NFL draft provide the best look at the public information available
regarding player skill at the time of the draft. The position where a player is selected in the
draft is largely representative of how NFL teams view his skills. In the model we include
the player’s overall selection number as well as a squared term to allow for a non-linear
effect. Also, the position played can significantly affect a player’s value to a given team, so
we include dummy variables controlling for the different position groups that players are
categorized into, which include: quarterback, running back, wide receiver, tight end, offensive
lineman, defensive lineman, linebacker, defensive back, kicker, and punter. Finally, we include
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a dummy variable denoting whether or not a drafted player attended a Division I-A (Football
Bowl Subdivision) university. Teams may place value on the fact that a player has competed
against the highest levels of competition in college football.
Our next set of controls (Ai) relate to the agent a player hires to negotiate a contract
on his behalf. It is likely that an agent with more experience is better suited to negotiate a
more favorable contract, with either higher total value or better terms (Conlin et al., 2013).
We use data on the number of years an agent has been certified with the NFLPA and the
number of other players represented as measures of agent experience.
Next, we consider team characteristics (Tn) which could affect player contract values.
First, a team’s win/loss record in the previous season largely determines where in the draft
order a team selects, and it may also alter the team’s willingness to offer favorable contract
terms early in the negotiating process. The intuition is that successful teams are less likely to
be in dire need of signing new rookie players compared to teams who have been performing
poorly. Second, as a proxy for revenue and popularity, we control for a team’s attendance
in the previous season with the ratio of empty seats in their stadium during home games.
Additionally, we account for the length of tenure for the team’s current head coach. A
long-tenured head coach may have more influence in player selection and contract negotiation
than a newly hired coach. We also include a set of team fixed effects to control for the
team participating in the negotiation, as different teams may approach this strategic setting
differently. In doing this, the variation in the model is determined across players over time
within a given team.
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Finally, we use controls for various state-level characteristics (Sn) which could impact
contract value and negotiation including, state per capita income, the unemployment rate,
and a dummy variable indicating whether or not a state has passed the Uniform Athlete
Agent Act (UAAA) which requires the registration of all agents at the state level.
Results of the initial model are shown in Table 2.2. Separate models are estimated using
either the total contract value or the average prorated contract value as the dependent
variable. Both of the models contain team fixed effects, as well as time fixed effects to control
for macroeconomic factors which affect contracts uniformly across players and teams (for
brevity, they are withheld from the tables).10 The variable of interest is the dummy variable
representing whether or not a player chose to hold out or delay contractual agreement until
after the start of training camp.
The results show that choosing to holdout has a positive effect on both total contract
value and average contract value.11 In particular, holding out has the effect of increasing total
contract by nearly 2 percent. While the effect is only statistically significant when looking at
the prorated average contract value, we explore a different model specification in the next
section which allows us to control for endogeneity. Also of note, based on the R-squared
values given in Table 2.2, our set of control variables capture (in large part) the factors that
cause variation in contract values due to the selection number in the draft being a significant
determinant of contract values.
10For this model, and throughout the paper, we also produced an alterntate version using state fixed effects
instead of team fixed effects (not shown). In all cases, this change did not have a meaningful impact on the
estimates.
11Also, as one might expect, a quantile regression model confirms that players who sign higher-valued
contracts enjoy larger benefits from holding out compared to those who sign relatively smaller contracts.
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2.5 Instrumental Variables Model
As discussed in Section 2.2, the previous literature fails to address the potential endogeneity
in the decision to hold out made by a player. Some possible sources of endogeneity in the
previous model are unobservable aspects of performance confounding the estimates12 or
differing risk preferences, whereby better players have more concern for injury which leads to
higher holdout rates. To address this issue we must find a valid instrument for the holdout
dummy variable or the censored holdout variable. In order for our chosen instrument to
be valid it must satisfy the following conditions. First, the instrument must be relevant,
meaning that it has a significant effect in the prediction of the endogenous variable. Second,
the instrument itself must be exogenous meaning that it can impact our dependent variable
only through its effect on the decision to hold out, and not through a direct effect. Finally,
the instrument should not be correlated with any unobservable control variables which would
confound the relationship.
2.5.1 Potential Instrument & First-Stage Results
We examine whether state income tax rates function as a valid instrument. First, we can
test whether the instrument is relevant through a first-stage regression where we consider the
decision to hold out as the dependent variable, and we see if state income tax rates have a
significant impact. A player who is negotiating with a team located in a high-tax state may
be more likely to hold out for better contract terms since a larger portion of their contract
12We would expect positive unobservable performance characterisitcs to be positively correlated with
holdout rates. Further, contract values by round are offered based on average expected performance, so a
high-ability unobservable would be negatively correlated with contract value. This type of endogeneity could
lead to underestimation or a downward bias in the OLS estimates.
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value is allocated to paying the tax. Second, we must argue that state tax rates should not
have a direct effect on contract values. The logic behind this argument is that, since NFL
teams face a hard salary cap in the period being studied, teams in high income tax states
cannot systemically offer more lucrative contracts to all players to compensate for the higher
tax rates.
Table 2.3 shows the results from the first-stage estimation where the decision to hold out
or the censored duration of a holdout is the dependent variable and the state income tax rate
is the instrument. The state tax rates used in this section correspond to the highest state
income tax rate imposed if the state uses a progressive taxing system, or the flat tax rate
in other states.13 The set of control variables remains the same from the previous section.
We use a probit model for the binary holdout decision, and a tobit model for the censored
duration of a holdout. The results in Table 2.3 show that state tax rates have a significant
impact on a player’s decision to delay contractual agreement.
The reasoning as to why this would be the case merits further discussion. The effect
found here may seem unusual since most employees are taxed by their place of residence.
So, a player could simply establish residence in a state with a lower income tax rate and
be unaffected by the tax rate where his team is located; however, the payment of state
income tax for professional athletes is a more complicated matter. Athletes are beholden to
a so-called “jock tax” which is sometimes a separate tax law but usually just an aggressive
extension of a regular income tax applied to selected nonresidents by a city or state (Hoffman
13State income tax rates for 2001-2007 were compiled from data available through the Tax Foundation:
http://taxfoundation.org/article/state-individual-income-tax-rates.
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and Hodge, 2004).14 The basic methodology determines a visiting athlete’s daily income in
that state by dividing the number of “duty days” into his annual salary. Most states consider
a duty day to be any day in which team activities are being held, such as regular season
games, preseason games, postseason games, practices, etc. For example, if an NFL player
has 150 duty days in a season, and they spend 15 of those days working in a given state, 10
percent of their annual salary will be considered taxable income in that state.
For a player who lives in the state in which his team plays, the majority of his salary will
be taxed at that state’s tax rate. Similarly, a player who lives in a different state will still
have the majority of his income taxed at his team’s home state tax rate since the majority of
his duty days will be in that state. In summary, regardless of where an NFL player chooses
to live, his tax liability will be most affected by the tax rate in his team’s home state. One
caveat is that signing bonuses are generally taxed only in a player’s home state provided the
bonus meets certain criteria.15 Therefore, a player could limit his tax exposure by setting
up residence in a lower tax state; however, it would require them to maintain two separate
residences (one year-round and one during the season) which often is not cost-effective,
especially for rookie players.
2.5.2 Maximum Likelihood IV Model & Results - Binary Holdout
In this section we combine the empirical improvements of this paper and estimate a full
maximum likelihood linear regression model with an endogenous binary treatment variable,
14The first instance of a jock tax was retaliation by the state of California when they taxed Chicago Bulls
players following their defeat of the Los Angeles Lakers in the 1991 NBA Finals. The tax strategy became
widespread from that time through 1995 (DiMascio, 2007).
15Based on a conversation with Sean Packard, CPA, who is Director of Tax at OFS Wealth. He specializes
in tax planning and the preparation of tax returns for professional athletes.
53
which represents the decision of whether or not to hold out. The model was originally derived
by Maddala (1983), and combines the previously described linear model for the outcome with
a probit first stage, estimated by maximum likelihood:
ln(Yi,n) = αHoldouti + β(Pi, Ai, Tn, Sn) + τt + ηn + ui (2.2)
and Holdouti is a binary-treatment variable defined as
Holdouti =

1, if wiγ + ϵi > 0
0, otherwise
(2.3)
where wi are the covariates used to model the decision to hold out, and the error terms ui
and ϵi are assumed to be bivariate normal with mean zero.
Table 2.4 shows that the estimated coefficients on the holdout dummy variable are
statistically significant (at the 1% level) when looking at the total contract value or the
average prorated value of the contract.16 This implies that a player’s decision to delay
contractual agreement until after the beginning of training camp is rewarded in the form of a
more lucrative contract. Given that our dependent variable in both models is log-transformed,
the magnitude of the treatment effect is directly interpreted as a semi-elasticity with the
effect calculated as [100 ∗ (eβ − 1)] since the variable of interest is binary (Halvorsen and
16While the estimated coefficients found in this model are similar in magnitude to those found using a
traditional (linear) two-stage least squares (2SLS) estimation, 2SLS estimation lacks the efficiency necessary
to achieve significant results due to the small sample size.
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Palmquist, 1980). Given that, the decision to hold out leads to about a 4.6 percent increase
in total contract value or just over a 5 percent increase in the average prorated contract value.
In order to calculate the marginal effect of interest in dollar terms, we must re-transform
the dependent variable, and we do so using a method based on Duan et al. (1983) and
Manning (1998). Following Duan et al. (1983), we use the “smearing factor” approach where
the marginal effect of holding out is calculated by:
∂E(Y |X)
∂x
= ϕs exp(x
′β + α)− ϕs exp(x′β), (2.4)
where the smearing factor, ϕs, is the estimated sample average of the exponentiated residuals
and α is the estimated coefficient on the holdout dummy variable. This approach is only
valid under the assumption of homoskedasticity; however, we can allow for heteroskedasticity
by defining subgroups in the sample within which the error term has a constant variance
and computing separate smearing factors for each subgroup. Under the assumption of
heteroskedasticity, using the round in which a player was selected in the draft as the
subgroup, the average marginal effect on the total contract value resulting from holding out is
approximately $119,000. Using the same method we also calculate the average marginal effect
of a holdout on the prorated average contract value and find the effect to be approximately
$30,000.
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2.5.3 Maximum Likelihood IVModel & Results - Censored Holdout
In the previous section, we examined the impact of the decision to hold out and treated it as
a binary decision, a player either holds out or he signs on time. The question remains as to
whether or not all holdouts are equal, or if there might be varying strength and intensity
amongst holdouts. Logically, it would seem to make sense that a player who holds out for
one day generates less bargaining power (and sends a less emphatic signal) than a player who
chooses to hold out for 5, 10, or even 15 days. Since we have data available on the exact
date in which a player signs a contract, we can also examine what impact the duration of a
holdout might have.
We specify a similar maximum likelihood model to the previous section, but in this case
we estimate a tobit first stage. Since we are using a censored distribution of holdout duration
we can rewrite Equation 2.3 as:
Holdouti =

wiγ + ϵi, if wiγ + ϵi > 0
0, otherwise
(2.5)
The model is estimated as a recursive mixed-process model according to Roodman (2011),
which allows for consistent estimation of recursive systems, of any form, where all endogeneous
variables are explanatory and observed. The first-stage estimates from this model are identical
to the tobit estimates found earlier in Table 2.3, column (2).
Table 2.5 shows the model results and the estimated coefficients on holdout duration are
positive and significant, as expected, for both the total contract value and average prorated
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value. This implies that as the duration of a holdout increases, so does the eventual contract
value. As in the previous model, given that our dependent variable is log-transformed, the
magnitude of the treatment effect is directly interpreted as a semi-elasticity where a one day
increase in holdout duration leads to about a 0.38 percent increase in total contract value
or to about a 0.45 percent increase in the average prorated contract value. As before, the
results are more useful and intuitive in level form, so we re-transform the marginal effects.
Following Duan et al. (1983), we again use the “smearing factor” approach where the
marginal effect of holding out is calculated by:
∂E(Y |X)
∂x
= ϕs exp(x
′β)β1 (2.6)
where the smearing factor, ϕs, is the estimated sample average of the exponentiated residuals
and β1 is the estimated coefficient of the holdout duration variable. Under the assumption of
heteroskedasticity, the average marginal effect on the total contract value resulting from each
additional day of a holdout is approximately $10,300. Given that a player chooses to holdout,
the average duration in the sample is 5.8 days. Therefore, for a holdout of average duration,
the estimated increase in total contract value is equal to roughly $60,000.
2.6 Discussion & Simulation
For simplicity, in this section we focus on the effects related to the total value of a contract.
The aim is to ensure that the estimated values in both stages of the instrumental variables
model are compatible with the presumed economic incentives of drafted NFL players.
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In order to determine the feasibility of the estimates, we consider a simple simulation in
which there is a one percentage point increase in state income tax rates. First, an increase
in tax rates causes a change in total tax liability for players. Second, based on our first-
stage estimation results, we showed that an increase in state tax rates leads to an increased
probability of a player holding out, which in turn increases the expected value from a holdout.
The questions to be answered are whether or not our estimated values are consistent in this
framework, and would these effects cause any unexpected incentives to arise for players (such
as delayed agreement having such overwhelming value that all players would hold out).
We first conduct the simulation using average marginal effects across all players, and
then examine any differences when evaluating the results by the round in which a player was
drafted.
Table 2.6 shows the simulation results. The average total contract value in the sample is
$2,746,000 which implies that a one percentage point increase in state tax rates increases
a player’s tax liability by $27,460. The estimated average marginal effect of a holdout is
$119,000 in the full sample; however, we are interested in finding the change in the expected
value of holding out. Based on the first-stage model results, a one percentage point increase
in state tax rate leads to about a six percent increase in the probability of holding out.
Therefore, a one percentage point increase in state tax rates increases a player’s expected
value from holding out by $7,140 ($119,000*0.06). The estimated values are in line with
expectations. While we expect that the decision to hold out provides additional value to
the player, if our simulation had shown an increase in expected value that was equal to or
larger than the additional tax liability it would imply that all players should choose to hold
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out, which we know is not the case. The simulation results seem to align with reality and
generate proper incentives in that the additional value from holding out is high enough to
encourage some players to do so, but not so high as to incentivize everyone to hold out.
Table 2.6 also shows simulation results where we breakdown the sample by the round in
which players were drafted. As expected, early round draft picks have higher contract values
which lead to higher marginal effects from holding out. The key result persists in that the
increases in the expected value from holding out are reasonably sized and do not imply that
all players should ultimately decide to hold out.
2.7 Robustness Check
When possible, it is useful to conduct further analysis to confirm and support the results
shown. In this section we discuss alternate results which further support our use of state
income tax rates as an instrumental variable.
We argued in Section 2.5 that state tax rates are a valid instrumental variable in our
model. The justification was based, in part, on the fact that since states enforce so-called
“jock taxes” a player will always face the largest tax burden from his team’s home state,
regardless of where he chooses to live. Therefore, it is logical that the state tax rate where
his team resides impacts his decision of whether or not to hold out for a better contract.
Since the enforcement of jock taxes only began in late 1991, we can use earlier NFL rookie
contract data to verify that the change in tax policy is important. In this section we examine
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rookie contract data from the 1986-91 seasons.17 We run similar first-stage regressions to
our previous analysis.18 Since the entire period occurs prior to the enforcement of state jock
taxes, we should expect to see that a team’s home state income tax rate should have a more
limited (or no) impact on a player’s contract decisions since he will only be taxed based on
where he chooses to live.
Table 2.7 shows the first stage results using the earlier contract data. We see that a
team’s tax rate in their home state now has no significant impact on a player’s decision to
delay contractual agreement, independent of whether we are modeling the holdout as a binary
decision or as a censored continuous variable. This provides further justification for our use
of state tax rates as a valid instrument in our model.
2.8 Summary & Conclusion
This paper provides the first estimates of the impact of a rookie NFL player’s decision to
hold out on their contract value that control for endogeneity in the holdout decision. The
estimated value of a holdout on the total contract value (in 2007 dollars) is approximately
$120,000, on average, across all players in the sample. Naturally, the value is greater for
players who are selected earlier in the draft and sign larger contracts, with the average effect
rising to nearly $430,000 for a first round draft pick. We also examine the differing effects of
17As before, this data was originally compiled by the NFLPA. Again, we are grateful to Michael Conlin for
providing access to the data.
18There are minor differences in the models due to differences in data availability. The Uniform Athlete
Agent Act only came into existence in 2000, so it is not relevant in the earlier set of data. Also, in the earlier
data we do not know how many other players a given agent represents. However, if we re-estimate the original
first-stage estimates without those two controls, it does not effect the significance of the results.
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holdout duration or intensity. For each additional day that a holdout continues, the effect on
the total contract value is $10,000, on average.
We set out to empirically analyze a strategic bargaining setting in which a player uses
a delay in contractual agreement as a negotiating strategy. In the specific context studied,
NFL rookie players are able to extract additional contract value by employing a strategy
where they delay agreement until after a deadline (in this case the start of the team’s training
camp). We face certain limitations in this study, primarily related to data availability. Ideally,
we would examine a larger sample of players, including both veteran and rookie players. Also,
having information available about the subsequent contracts signed by each player would
be useful in testing the private information aspect of the model. It is impossible to observe
whether or not, at the time of negotiation, a player holds some positive private information,
but we could test this theory by evaluating player performance in the years following a player
being drafted/signed. By observing whether a player over or underperformed statistically,
relative to his draft position, in the years following the draft we could infer whether or not
that player may have had positive private information regarding his ability.
Even given these constraints, it is still useful to broaden this result and think about
whether the same strategy could be useful and effective in other bargaining situations. In
all likelihood, NFL rookie players had less leverage in their contract negotiations than a
typical employee since they are prevented from signing with another NFL team, although
their skills are likely more scarce than in many other professions. This situation would be
comparable to an employee trying to negotiate a new employment contract after having
signed a non-compete agreement, which would prevent the employee from signing a contract
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with any direct competitors. Even with the somewhat minimal leverage that NFL rookie
players possess, we find that delaying agreement still had value in negotiating better contract
terms, and likely acted as a signal to an NFL team that the player holds some positive private
information about his skill or ability level.
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Fig. 2.1 Distribution of Total Contract Values ($000s)
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Fig. 2.2 Distribution of Average Contract Values ($000s)
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Fig. 2.3 Distribution of Holdouts
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Fig. 2.4 Distribution of Holdouts (Censored)
66
Table 2.1 Descriptive Statistics for 2001-07 Contract Data
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Total contract value ($000s) 1776 2,746.01 3,388.16 253.00 25,718.22
Avg. prorated value ($000s) 1776 620.41 503.31 253.00 4,276.42
Signing bonus ($000s) 1776 612.63 1,126.09 0.00 10,920.00
Contract length (years) 1776 3.81 1.03 1.00 7.00
Holdout duration (days) 1776 -10.62 19.26 -94.00 98.00
Holdout (0 or 1) 1776 0.19 0.40 0.00 1.00
Division I-A (FBS) School 1776 0.91 0.28 0.00 1.00
Quarterback 1776 0.05 0.22 0.00 1.00
Running back 1776 0.09 0.28 0.00 1.00
Wide receiver 1776 0.13 0.34 0.00 1.00
Tight end 1776 0.06 0.23 0.00 1.00
Offensive lineman 1776 0.17 0.38 0.00 1.00
Defensive lineman 1776 0.18 0.38 0.00 1.00
Linebacker 1776 0.11 0.32 0.00 1.00
Defensive back 1776 0.19 0.40 0.00 1.00
Kicker 1776 0.01 0.0.07 0.00 1.00
Punter 1776 0.01 0.12 0.00 1.00
Team win/loss (prev. season) 1776 7.83 3.11 0.00 15.00
Head coach tenure 1776 3.97 3.05 1.00 15.00
Ratio empty seats (prev. season) 1776 0.05 0.08 0.00 0.53
# players agent represents 1776 19.47 14.11 1.00 67.00
Agent experience in years 1776 9.98 6.40 0.00 24.00
State income tax rate 1776 4.79 3.19 0.00 10.30
State per capita income ($000s) 1776 34.91 4.96 25.28 50.26
State unemployment rate 1776 5.20 0.89 3.00 7.40
UAAA (0 or 1) 1776 0.41 0.49 0.00 1.00
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Table 2.2 OLS Regression Results
(1) (2)
VARIABLES ln(TotalValue) ln(AveragePay)
Holdout 0.0175 0.0185*
(0.0119) (0.0107)
Division I-A School -0.000227 0.000644
(0.00656) (0.00703)
Selection Number -0.0131*** -0.0137***
(0.000581) (0.000554)
Selection Number2 3.34e-05*** 3.56e-05***
(1.81e-06) (1.76e-06)
Agent - Players represented 0.000126 0.000138
(0.000149) (0.000176)
Agent - Years certified -3.75e-05 6.71e-05
(0.000482) (0.000470)
Team - Head coach tenure -0.000440 -0.000630
(0.00136) (0.00113)
Team - Ratio of empty seats 0.0364 0.0378
(0.0471) (0.0388)
Team - Win/loss record -0.00275* -0.00310**
(0.00145) (0.00130)
State - Per capita income 5.35e-06 7.11e-06*
(4.67e-06) (3.84e-06)
State - UAAA -0.00944 -0.00466
(0.0116) (0.0105)
State - Unemployment Rate 0.00117 0.00562
(0.00811) (0.00640)
Constant 6.862*** 6.454***
(0.250) (0.190)
Observations 1,776 1,776
R-squared 0.971 0.939
Notes: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Standard errors
clustered at the state level in parentheses. Team and year fixed
effects are also included in the model, but not shown. Controls
for player position are also included and not shown, but have the
expected pattern where coefficients for all positions are negative,
relative to quarterbacks.
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Table 2.3 First-Stage Regression Results
(1) (2)
Probit Tobit
VARIABLES Holdout (0 or 1) Holdout (censored)
State Tax Rate 0.292*** 3.387***
(0.0758) (0.828)
Division I-A School 0.0486 1.013
(0.136) (1.428)
Selection Number -0.0213*** -0.201***
(0.00323) (0.0383)
Selection Number2 5.51e-05*** 0.000521***
(1.07e-05) (0.000120)
Agent - Players represented 0.00458 0.0292
(0.00304) (0.0367)
Agent - Years certified 0.00590 0.125
(0.00753) (0.0902)
Team - Head coach tenure 0.0499 0.426
(0.0489) (0.484)
Team - Ratio of empty seats 0.668 2.288
(1.405) (12.33)
Team - Win/loss record 0.0377 0.186
(0.0247) (0.253)
State - Per capita income -9.99e-05 -0.00109
(0.000100) (0.00103)
State - UAAA 0.366 4.494*
(0.254) (2.487)
State - Unemployment Rate 0.0204 0.125
(0.208) (1.904)
Constant 1.956 10.84
(4.940) (48.39)
Observations 1,776 1,776
Notes: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Standard errors clus-
tered at the state level in parentheses. Team and year fixed effects
are also included in the model, but not shown. Controls for player
position are also included and not shown, but have the expected
pattern where coefficients for all positions are negative, relative to
quarterbacks.
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Table 2.4 Maximum Likelihood Binary Endogenous Variable Results
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Outcome First Stage Outcome First Stage
VARIABLES ln(TotalValue) Holdout ln(AveragePay) Holdout
Holdout 0.0445*** 0.0490***
(0.0158) (0.0146)
State Tax Rate 0.292*** 0.292***
(0.0758) (0.0758)
[0.059] [0.059]
Division I-A School -0.000564 0.0486 0.000263 0.0486
(0.00671) (0.136) (0.00725) (0.136)
Selection Number -0.0129*** -0.0213*** -0.0135*** -0.0213***
(0.000550) (0.00323) (0.000539) (0.00323)
Selection Number2 3.30e-05*** 5.51e-05*** 3.51e-05*** 5.51e-05***
(1.72e-06) (1.07e-05) (1.71e-06) (1.07e-05)
Agent - Players rep. 9.76e-05 0.00458 0.000105 0.00458
(0.000147) (0.00304) (0.000169) (0.00304)
Agent - Years certified -6.13e-05 0.00590 4.03e-05 0.00590
(0.000469) (0.00753) (0.000446) (0.00753)
Team - Coach tenure -0.000623 0.0499 -0.000837 0.0499
(0.00147) (0.0489) (0.00122) (0.0489)
Team - Ratio empty seats 0.0346 0.668 0.0358 0.668
(0.0461) (1.405) (0.0417) (1.405)
Team - Win/loss record -0.00289** 0.0377 -0.00326** 0.0377
(0.00142) (0.0247) (0.00129) (0.0247)
State - Per capita income 5.67e-06 -9.99e-05 7.48e-06* -9.99e-05
(4.82e-06) (0.000100) (4.12e-06) (0.000100)
State - UAAA -0.0106 0.366 -0.00594 0.366
(0.0118) (0.254) (0.0110) (0.254)
State - Unemp. rate 0.00109 0.0204 0.00553 0.0204
(0.00812) (0.208) (0.00657) (0.208)
Constant 6.876*** 1.956 6.436*** 1.956
(0.254) (4.940) (0.203) (4.940)
Observations 1,776 1,776 1,776 1,776
Notes: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Standard errors clustered at the state level
in parentheses. Relevant marginal effects are included in [brackets]. Team and year fixed
effects are also included in the model, but not shown. Controls for player position are also
included and not shown, but have the expected pattern where coefficients for all positions
are negative, relative to quarterbacks.
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Table 2.5 Maximum Likelihood Censored Endogenous Variable Results
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Outcome First Stage Outcome First Stage
VARIABLES ln(TotalValue) Holdout ln(AveragePay) Holdout
Holdout Duration 0.00375* 0.00455**
(0.00222) (0.00197)
State Tax Rate 3.387*** 3.387***
(0.828) (0.828)
Division I-A School -0.000661 1.013 7.03e-05 1.013
(0.00620) (1.428) (0.00659) (1.428)
Selection Number -0.0130*** -0.201*** -0.0136*** -0.201***
(0.000540) (0.0383) (0.000473) (0.0383)
Selection Number2 3.32e-05*** 0.000521*** 3.53e-05*** 0.000521***
(1.66e-06) (0.000120) (1.51e-06) (0.000120)
Agent - Players rep. 0.000146 0.0292 0.000158 0.0292
(0.000140) (0.0367) (0.000160) (0.0367)
Agent - Years certified -0.000138 0.125 -5.78e-05 0.125
(0.000425) (0.0902) (0.000423) (0.0902)
Team - Coach tenure -0.000398 0.426 -0.000597 0.426
(0.00141) (0.484) (0.00123) (0.484)
Team - Ratio empty seats 0.0425 2.288 0.0449 2.288
(0.0431) (12.33) (0.0358) (12.33)
Team - Win/loss record -0.00241* 0.186 -0.00269** 0.186
(0.00136) (0.253) (0.00119) (0.253)
State - Per capita income 5.37e-06 -0.00109 7.17e-06* -0.00109
(4.78e-06) (0.00103) (3.98e-06) (0.00103)
State - UAAA -0.0108 4.494* -0.00641 4.494*
(0.0119) (2.487) (0.0108) (2.487)
State - Unemp. rate 0.00137 0.125 0.00585 0.125
(0.00851) (1.904) (0.00691) (1.904)
Constant 6.906*** 10.84 6.467*** 10.84
(0.254) (48.39) (0.196) (48.39)
Observations 1,776 1,776 1,776 1,776
Notes: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Standard errors clustered at the state level
in parentheses. Team and year fixed effects are also included in the model, but not shown.
Controls for player position are also included and not shown, but have the expected pattern
where coefficients for all positions are negative, relative to quarterbacks.
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Table 2.6 Simulation Results - Binary Holdout
Round Average Max. Change in Tax Estimated Change in
Contract Value Liability from 1% Marginal Effect Expected Value
Increase in Tax Rate from Holding Out of Holdout
– $2,746,000 $27,460 $119,000 $7,140
1 $10,140,000 $101,400 $434,000 $26,040
2 $3,200,000 $32,000 $142,000 $8,520
3 $1,870,000 $18,700 $83,000 $4,980
4 $1,600,000 $16,000 $71,000 $4,260
5 $1,350,000 $13,500 $59,000 $3,540
6 $1,250,000 $12,500 $55,000 $3,300
7 $1,170,000 $11,700 $51,000 $3,060
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Table 2.7 Robustness Check Using 1986-91 Contract Data
(1) (2)
Probit Tobit
VARIABLES Holdout (0 or 1) Holdout (censored)
State Tax Rate -0.0293 -0.635
(0.0230) (0.625)
Division I-A School 0.0131 1.649
(0.0300) (1.024)
Selection Number -0.00272*** -0.210***
(0.000450) (0.0170)
Selection Number2 3.46e-06*** 0.000439***
(1.19e-06) (4.41e-05)
Agent - Years Certified 0.0124** 0.432*
(0.00503) (0.252)
Team - Head coach tenure 0.00697 0.0749
(0.00475) (0.112)
Team - Ratio of empty seats -5.38e-07* -3.13e-06
(3.03e-07) (1.14e-05)
Team - Win/loss record 0.00925 0.0254
(0.00857) (0.250)
State - Per capita income -1.12e-06 0.000607
(4.31e-05) (0.00122)
State - Unemployment rate 0.0351** 1.294**
(0.0132) (0.511)
Constant 1.167 -0.185
(0.923) (0.962)
Observations 1,872 1,872
Notes: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Standard errors
clustered at the state level in parentheses. Team and year fixed
effects are also included in the model, but not shown. Controls for
player position are also included and not shown.
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Chapter 3
Labor Market Impacts of Sports:
Evaluating the Effect of Lower Tier
Professional Sports Arenas on Local
Communities
3.1 Introduction
The “benefits” of sports stadiums and arenas to local economies have been touted for years
as public funds are sought to subsidize the ever-growing cost of constructing these facilities.
We often see owners of sports franchises lobbying for state and/or local funding to build new
arenas as their respective teams generate millions of dollars in profit. We also see these same
state and local governments giving in to what sometimes appear to be outrageous demands
under threat that teams will move on to a new city if the funding is not provided. In an
effort to avoid public criticism, government leaders sometimes argee to provide exorbitant
funding which can cost the public dearly in the long-run.
Most of the publicity in this area is generated by teams participating in one of the four
major professional sports leagues in the U.S. Teams operating in Major League Baseball
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(MLB), the National Football League (NFL), the National Basketball Association (NBA),
and the National Hockey League (NHL) often face pressure to continue playing in the newest,
most advanced, fan-friendly venues in order to continue to draw fans to games amongst
increasing competition for entertainment dollars. In order to assuage taxpayer and legislator
concerns teams have taken the step of commissioning economic impact studies in order to
prove the value of a new stadium, either in their current city or a potential re-location city,
and justify the cost.1 Seeing as though these studies are often requested and paid for by the
very teams who stand to benefit from public stadium finanacing, they should be taken with a
grain of salt.
Due to this inherent conflict of interest, when looking at previous literature on the subject
it is important to distinguish between “the promotional literature versus the economists” as
Coates and Humphreys (2008) call it. Within the promotional literature, work done largely
by consulting firms, it is argued that public subsidies are warranted because of the local
economic development benefits of building a stadium or arena. The economic development
benefits which are typically of most interest in these studies are income and job creation,
along with increased tax revenue (Coates and Humphreys, 2008). In this paper we focus on
the previous economic literature, which has largely attempted to verify the claims made by
the promotional literature with little success.
While most of the publicity and attention has centered around the financing and economic
benefits of stadiums and arenas designed for major professional sports teams, there are
substantial amounts of money (both public and private) being used to construct arenas for
1A recent example is an economic impact analysis jointly commissioned by the NFL’s San Diego Chargers
and Oakland Raiders to evaluate a “Los Angeles” stadium in Carson, CA (Cooper et al., 2015)
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lower tier professional teams.2 In this paper we study whether or not these smaller, less
well-known arenas are able to generate any localized economic benefits and more specifically,
labor market benefits. While the size, impact, and cost of the arenas to be studied in
this paper differ substantially from their more popular counterparts, it should still be of
vital interest as to whether or not they provide any proven economic benefits for the local
communities which commit to building them. We also expand the analysis to the more
common major arenas in order to see if they produce different results, and to see if our
findings differ from the previous literature.
3.2 Background
A wealth of academic literature exists related to the economic impacts of different types of
sports facilities. The research is generally of two types: case study analysis which focuses on
a single stadium or arena project, or broader analysis looking for economic impacts generated
by sports facilities of a certain type, usually related to the NFL, NBA, MLB, or NHL. For our
purposes we will focus on the broader analysis, and not single arena case studies. In a survey
of the literature, Coates and Humphreys (2008) find consistency in that professional sports
franchises and facilities generally have had no measurable economic impact on local/regional
economies. The studies reviewed range in data, estimators and model specifications used, as
well as using different cities or geographical areas.3
2Throughout the remainder of this paper, the term “arena” is used to describe an indoor sports facility
often used to host basketball and hockey games and other events.
3Some of the relevant work surveyed by Coates and Humphreys (2008) is discussed below. For additional
literature on the economic impact of sports, see Baade and Dye (1998); Hudson (1999); Lertwachara and
Cochran (2007)
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Baade and Sanderson (1997) estimated employment created by sports facilities using data
for ten cities in the years 1958 through 1993. They found very little effect on employment
shares from new facility construction. In general, they could find no overall link between
professional sports teams and job creation. Coates and Humphreys (1999) followed by
studying the impact of professional sports on per capita income. Included in their data are
all 37 metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs) that had an NFL, MLB, or NBA team from
1967-1994. They concluded that professional sports teams had no positive effect on per capita
income within a metropolitan statistical area.
In later work, Coates and Humphreys (2003) used the same methodology to analyze
wages and employment in two specific sectors of the economy: service and retail. They found
evidence of stadiums and arenas having positive effects on earnings in one sector, but being
counterbalanced by negative effects on earnings and employment in other sectors. Similarly,
Gius and Johnson (2001) examined the impact of professional sports teams on per capita
income in metropolitan areas. They included data from cities with populations greater than
25,000 from the 1988 and 1994 City and County Data Books. Again, they were unable to
find any significant impact on wages.
Siegfried and Zimbalist (2000) reviewed some of the relevant academic and promotional
literature and found the same stark contrast in results. They offered three reasons why
professional sports teams may not generate positive economic impacts. First, consumers
largely have an inflexible leisure budget, so any additional money that is spent on sporting
events is simply shifted away from another form of leisure. Second, much of the increased
income generated from a professional sports team is likely to leak out of the local economy
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due to taxation, savings, and out-of-town residents. Finally, new sports facilities typically
have a negative budgetary impact on local governments, since financing is often provided
with little to show for it in terms of increased tax collections.
Jasina and Rotthoff (2008) broke the geographical mold by estimating potential impacts
that professional sports franchises have on county employment and wages. They found mixed
results on employment in the clothing, drinking, food, hotel, and liquor industries when a
sports franchise is present, and mostly negative effects on payroll.
Recently, Coates (2015) revisited the previous work by Coates and Humphreys (1999) and
incorporated an additional 17 years of data along with a number of new stadiums, arenas,
and franchises. Using data on all metropolitan statistical areas from 1969-2011, he finds little
change from the original study in which the presence of teams and arenas frequently indicate
harmful effects on per capita income, wages, and wages per job.
A consistent theme throughout the literature is a focus on sports facilities associated with
top-level professional sports franchises and estimating different economic impacts at relatively
broad geographic levels, such as metropolitan statistical areas along with one additional
study at the county level.4 In contrast, this paper focuses on the growing set of arenas that
are utilized for events and athletics below the top-tier professional level. In a 2001 article
published by the Minneapolis Federal Reserve it is noted that, “Given the relatively small
to nonexistent benefits from team sports at higher levels, one should not expect anything
4There has been some case study-type analysis done for individual facilities which host lower-tier professional
sports teams. For example, Hodur et al. (2006) studied the economic impact of the FARGODOME in Fargo,
ND.
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or very, very little from minor league activities” (Wirtz, 2001). In the following sections we
analyze whether or not that preconceived notion is indeed accurate.
3.3 Data Availability & Arena Sample
In this paper, we advance the current research in two ways: by analyzing the potential
economic impacts of arenas which have not previously been studied, and by narrowing the
geographic regions being analyzed. We create a dataset of 24 sports arenas, built since
the mid-1990’s, that do not host any teams which play in the NFL, NBA, MLB, or NHL.
To develop this list we focus largely on teams which participate in the American Hockey
League (AHL) and the ECHL (formerly the East Coast Hockey League). While these are
still professional sports leagues, they operate below the top-level sports leagues, and in this
case function as developmental leagues for the NHL. Also included in the dataset are arenas
which function as a home for developmental league (D-League) NBA teams, or for arena
football teams. Some arenas in the dataset are the primary host for teams in more than one
of these leagues, and there is also a fair amount of movement of teams coming and going
from a given arena. For this reason, we focus on estimating the economic impact from the
arena itself, detached from whichever particular team is playing there in a given year.
There are notable differences between the arenas and locations identified in our sample
versus that of the previous literature. As shown in Table 3.1, the average population for the
cities in our sample is about 165,000 and the average arena capacity is around 10,500. By
contrast, the majority of cities which host a professional sports franchise in the NFL, NBA,
MLB, or NHL have populations in excess of one million people. While the seating capacity
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of stadiums and arenas vary wildly by sport, as a comparison, arenas that host an NHL team
have capacities ranging from 15,000 to 21,000, with an average capacity just over 18,000.5
Not surprisingly, on average, top-tier professional sports teams are located in significantly
larger cities and play in much larger stadiums and arenas. Due to these differences, it is
important to evaluate these arenas on a different scale. While it may make sense in the
previous literature to estimate labor market effects at the MSA level, it seems unlikely that
smaller arenas, which host lower level teams would be able to move the needle on that scale.
In order to focus our attention on more localized economic impacts we use ZIP Code
Business Patterns (ZBP) data published by the Census Bureau. The data are published
on an annual basis and provide employment, income, and business establishment counts by
ZIP code. The data are available from 1998 through 2013, and for this reason we limit our
analysis to arenas built during this time period. These data allow us to analyze potential
economic impacts at a more precise geographic level than the previous literature which used
metropolitan statistical areas or, in one case, counties.
The previous work of Jasina and Rotthoff (2008) moved in the direction of estimating
more localized labor market effects by shifting their analysis from the MSA level to the county
level. While the county level may seem like a fairly narrow geographic scope, the numbers tell
a different story. Many of the largest cities in the United States, where professional sports
franchises are often located, are found in counties with populations in excess of one million.6
To give a broad comparison of size between MSAs, counties, and ZIP codes, consider that
5A listing of the 30 current NHL arenas along with their capacities can be found at:
http://statshockey.homestead.com/info/nhlarenas.html
6For example, based on 2010 populations, Los Angeles County has nearly 10 million residents. In addition,
Cook County (Chicago), San Diego County, Miami-Dade County, and Dallas County all have populations in
excess of 2 million.
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the average MSA has a population just over 700,000. Counties are significantly smaller, but
across the more than 3,000 counties in the U.S. the average population exceeds 100,000. ZIP
codes, however, are established at a much finer geographic level. There are in excess of 40,000
ZIP codes in the U.S. and the average population is under 10,000 residents. It is for these
reasons that we choose to focus our analysis on potential labor market effects at the ZIP
code level.
Figures 3.1 & 3.2 provide a visual representation of the difference in scope between
county-level and ZIP-code-level analysis. The example shown is the Intrust Bank Arena
located in Wichita, Kansas. Figure 3.1 shows the location of the arena in ZIP code 67202,
surrounded by four neighboring ZIP codes. Figure 3.2 shows an expanded map of Sedgwick
County, Kansas, of which ZIP code 67202 is a part. As seen in the figure, Sedgwick County
contains all (or part) of more than 20 ZIP codes.
Table 3.2 provides summary statistics regarding employment and wages for the 24 ZIP
codes included in the sample, which correspond to the arenas listed in Table 3.1. Each ZIP
code has 16 years of annual data, from 1998-2013. The averages across all ZIP codes for each
labor market measure are just under 15,000 employees, about $604 million in annual payroll,
nearly $38,000 in annual pay per employee, and around 820 establishments.
3.4 Empirical Models
In order to estimate the potential labor market impacts of a new arena, we need to identify
an appropriate control method for identification. Previous literature provides some basis for
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estimating these effects, and we explore several different methods of analysis in the sections
that follow.
3.4.1 Pre/Post Analysis
The simplest solution is a pre/post analysis where we include in the sample only the ZIP
codes in which a stadium was constructed. The dynamic panel model is expressed as:
yit = αArenait + γyit−1 + ηi + τt + ϵit (3.1)
where yit is a given labor market measure (employment, total annual payroll, average pay per
employee, or number of establishments), Arenait is a dummy variable denoting whether or
not an arena exists in a ZIP code in a given year, yit−1 is the lagged labor market measure,
ηi is a ZIP code fixed effect, and τt is a time fixed effect. In this model, the estimated effect
of an arena is based on comparing the employment (or wages) in a given ZIP code prior to
and after the construction of an arena. We also present results from a static version of the
model which drops the lagged labor market measure as an independent variable.
The estimation procedure depends on whether we are using the dynamic or static version
of the model. The static model is estimated as a linear model with ZIP code and time fixed
effects. The dynamic model cannot be estimated in the same way due to the presence of
dynamic panel bias from the inclusion of the lagged dependent variable (Nickell, 1981). The
issue of achieving consistent estimates in dynamic panel models has been frequently discussed
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in the literature.7 In this paper, we use a system generalized method of moments (GMM)
estimator which allows for all available further lags of the dependent variables to serve as
instruments for the dynamic term in the model. Roodman (2009) describes the system GMM
procedure in great detail and provides insight into the empirical application.
Table 3.3 shows the results of this analysis from both models. The coefficients of interest
are those on the dummy variable for whether or not an arena was constructed. There is a
clear tradeoff in the use of the two models presented. The static version of the model requires
fewer assumptions about the data, but the data being used lack sufficient control variables so
we are left to rely on ZIP code and time fixed effects. We find positive coefficients on the
arena variable for each labor market measure and a significant result when looking at the
effect of arena construction on the total annual payroll in the ZIP code. The obvious concern
is that the positive results are due to unobserved heterogeneity that we are unable to control
for given the current data.
The dynamic version of the model allows us to better control for current period labor
market conditions by using a lagged dependent variable. As discussed previously, this creates
additional issues in trying to produce consistent estimates. The system GMM model being
used is designed in a way that a large number of instrumental variables are included, and in
such a small sample size there is a concern that the results shown could be an artifact of the
model design. In the dynamic model, we see negative, significant effects on employment and
annual payrolls as a result of an arena being constructed. If this result were to hold it would
be a departure from the expectation that sports arenas have positive labor market impacts.
7The estimation technique used in this paper is grounded in the work of Anderson and Hsiao (1982),
Holtz-Eakin et al. (1988), and Arellano and Bond (1991).
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The main issue with the use of the pre/post analysis is that we are relying on each
individual ZIP code, along with the other ZIP codes which have had arenas built, to act as
controls. The problem arises because we have no way of observing the counterfactual outcome
of what would have happened to employment and wages in a given ZIP code had an arena
never been constructed. There is also no reason to believe that two ZIP codes have similar
labor market dynamics just because they each have had an arena constructed during the
period of study. In order to provide a better control group for identification it is necessary
to find untreated ZIP codes, or ones which have never had an arena constructed, which are
similar to the ZIP codes in our sample. A secondary issue with the model in this form is that
we assume time period fixed effects are constant across all ZIP codes included in the sample,
which rules out the possibility of heterogeneous time trends. The next section of this paper
identifies an alternate method of identification and control for the model.
3.4.2 Contiguous ZIP Code Group Analysis
The second empirical strategy borrows from Dube et al. (2010) who estimated the labor
market impact of minimum wages by using contiguous county pairs as a better way to control
for spatial heterogeneity. In that paper, adjacent counties from neighboring states were paired
based on the fact that the two states had different minimum wage levels. By pairing the
contiguous counties, each pair can be used to control for heterogeneity under the assumption
that neighboring counties would be affected by the same exogeneous shocks.
In order to apply a similar procedure in this paper we not only identify the ZIP code
in which an arena is located, but we also identify the surrounding ZIP codes (ones which
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border the area of interest). This allows for the estimation of any differing employment or
wage effects between the home ZIP code and surrounding areas. If there are any positive
effects found in the local ZIP code, this approach should allow us to identify whether those
effects are the result of a simple shift of employment from outer areas into the home area, or
if there is actual job creation happening as a result of the new arena.
Table 3.4 lists the same 24 arenas used in the previous sample, and includes the ZIP code
for the arena itself, as well as any contiguous, border ZIP codes.8 Each arena (ZIP code) in
the sample has between two and seven surrounding ZIP codes matched to it.
Table 3.5 provides summary statistics regarding employment and wages for the 24 ZIP
codes where an arena was constructed and the 112 surrounding ZIP codes included in the
sample. Each ZIP code has 16 years of annual data, from 1998-2013. The average level of
employment across the sample is just under 11,000, and the average annual pay per employee
is around $34,600. While different, this sample is similar to the original arena-only sample in
terms of labor market characteristics.
In this preferred specification, we deviate from Dube et al. (2010) in that, instead of
individually pairing the arena ZIP code with each neighboring ZIP code, we form ZIP code
groups. Since each ZIP code in our sample belongs to a single grouping of ZIP codes (a home
ZIP code and the neighboring ZIP codes), it makes sense to allow the time fixed effects in
the model to vary by these groups. Since the ZIP code is such a narrow geographic area, any
exogenous shock which were to affect the labor market in a given pairing of ZIP codes could
8The ZIP code in which an arena is located can be identified by the mailing address. The surrounding
ZIP codes are identified using a ZIP code mapping tool, such as http://www.usnaviguide.com. A handful of
neighboring ZIP codes were excluded from the analysis due to a lack of data availability in the ZBP Census
data.
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reasonably be expected to affect the other surrounding ZIP codes in the group. We can write
the new model specification as:
yit = αArenait + γyit−1 + ηi + τgt + ϵigt (3.2)
where we allow for group-specific time effects (τgt), which uses only the variation within each
grouping of ZIP codes. Similar to the previous section, we also estimate a static version of the
model where the lagged dependent variable is excluded from the right-hand-side variables.
Table 3.6 shows the results of the analysis for both versions of the model. Since we are
allowing for differing time trends at the group level, it is logical to estimate standard errors
clustered at the group level as well. We find a similar pattern to the previous results. When
looking at the static model, there are positive coefficients on the arena dummy variable for
all labor market factors. Additionally, the positive effect on annual payroll is statistically
significant at the 5% level, and the impact on average pay is significant at the 10% level.
However, as with the previous static model there is a concern for uncontrolled heterogeneity
since we are limited by the data to only ZIP-code and group-specific time fixed effects. The
results from the dynamic model again show largely negative coefficients, implying a decrease
in labor market factors as the result of a new arena being constructed. The only statistically
significant result is a decrease of nearly 10 establishments, which in context represents a
relatively small average decrease of about 1.5% of total establishments in a given ZIP code as
the result of a new arena opening.
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There is an additional concern when analyzing the results from the model as it is currently
specified. By using a binary variable to represent the presence of an arena, we are estimating
the average labor market impact over the entire length of the sample. This could work to
lessen any immediate measurable impact that the arena might have by spreading the effect
out over 5, 10 or even 15 years depending on when the arena was constructed within the
sample period. The solution to this issue is to estimate separate effects for each year after an
arena was constructed, and to limit the window in which we expect to see an impact.9 In
the following analysis we create five separate dummy variables representing one year after
arena opening, two years after arena opening, and so on. We limit the window to five years
because it seems likely that any expected labor market impact should be observable within
five years after the arena opens, and it limits the exposure to unobserved factors affecting
the labor market as we increase the timeframe.
Table 3.7 presents the results of the analysis using the preferred dynamic model specifica-
tion.10 A cursory look at the results shows that none of the new arena variables generates
statistically significant results. One interesting pattern that emerges in the estimated coeffi-
cients is that they are largely negative in the first and second years after an arena opens, but
in the third year after opening the coefficients turn positive for all four labor market measures.
It may be possible that the arena construction disrupts the surrounding labor market and
causes a negative impact initially, only to have the labor market recover and improve later
on. However, given the lack of significant and convincing results, it is purely speculation.
9The concept of estimating variable treatment effects over time is not a novel one. Chandra et al. (2010)
provide one example in which a similar procedure is used.
10An alternative way to estimate a similar variable treatment effect is to change the observation window
in the data. For example, we could cut the data to only include five years of sample after each arena was
constructed. Using this approach does not materially change the results shown in this section.
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3.5 Comparison with Top-Tier Professional Arenas
As discussed previously, most of the empirical analysis on this subject has focused on the
economic impact of stadiums and arenas which host top-tier professional sports teams. In
order to more fully understand the results presented in this paper and how they compare to
the previous literature, it seems worthwhile to evaluate the effects of those arenas as well. To
facilitate the comparison, we consider the same time period and use the same ZIP code data
used thus far. Since the original analysis in this paper focused on arenas which primarily
hosted lower tier professional hockey and basketball teams, we extend the analysis here to
examine arenas which host NHL and NBA teams.
Table 3.8 provides a listing of arenas built during the period 1998-2013, and which
primarily hosted a team that plays in the NHL, NBA, or both. There are 20 arenas included
in this sample, all of which were constructed between 1999-2012. In comparison with the
previous sample, these arenas are much larger in terms of seating capacity with an average
of just over 18,000 seats compared to about 10,500 in the lower-tier arenas. There is also
a significant difference in terms of the cost to build the different types of arenas. In our
previous sample, the average construction cost was around $72 million. The sample of arenas
included here range in cost from $220-550 million.11 Does that extra cost and increased
capacity lead to a different result in terms of economic or labor market impact? To conduct
this analysis we use the preferred specification (from Section 3.4.2) where surrounding ZIP
codes are identified and used as controls for the home ZIP code in which the arena is located.
11Costs associated with the construction of these more recent NHL and NBA arenas can be found at:
http://www.macleans.ca/authors/amanda-shendruk/the-20-most-expensive-nhl-arenas.
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Table 3.9 provides summary statistics regarding the labor market conditions of the home
and surrounding ZIP codes for this new sample. In comparison with the previous sample,
the ZIP codes used here are larger, on average, with more establishments, higher levels of
employment and wages, and higher average pay per employee. This is no surprise since NHL
and NBA teams tend to locate in larger cities with higher population densities compared to
their lower tier league counterparts. For completeness, Table 3.10 shows the breakdown of
the ZIP codes being used in this section.
Table 3.11 reports the results from the estimation of labor market effects due to the
construction of an NBA or NHL arena. Similar to the results in previous sections, we estimate
both a dynamic and a static version of the model. As before, it is likely that the static model
is overstating any possible effects due to inadequate control variables in the data, and similar
to previous results we see some positive labor market impacts from that model. Both annual
payroll and average annual pay show positive, significant increases as a result of an arena
being constructed. The only negative coefficient is on the number of establishments, but
that impact is very imprecisely estimated. The dynamic model pulls back on some of those
positive results, but still shows agreement with a statistically significant increase in average
annual pay as the result of a new NHL or NBA arena.
Once again there is concern that the results are influenced due to the specification used
where the dummy variable for an arena being present is set to one for every year after
construction. This could cause an immediate labor market impact to be washed out when
averaging over a long time period, or it could cause a spurious significant impact to show in
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the data due to a long-term change in labor market conditions. In either case, we follow the
same approach used in Section 3.4.2 to estimate the variable effect of an arena by year.
Table 3.12 shows the results of the analysis. We find a fairly significant deviation from
the previous model. This may indicate that some other long-term factors may have been
influencing the previous estimates but do not impact the results in this shorter five-year
window. We see a significant increase in the number of establishments in year one following
the arena opening, and the positive coefficients continue in subsequent years. There is a
similar pattern in employment, where a decrease in the first year is followed by three years
of positive coefficients. Interestingly, in contrast to the original dynamic model, the results
show nearly all negative results for annual payrolls and, in turn, average annual pay. As with
many of the results presented in this paper, since we lack consistent, significant results we
can only speculate about whether the results may be meaningful.
3.6 Discussion
The results found in Section 3.5 are in line with the previous literature in that there appears to
be little, if any, significant labor market impact as a result of the addition of a stadium/arena
in a given area. The approach used in this paper is similar to Coates and Humphreys (1999)
and Coates (2015), but the models are estimated at different geographic levels. The previous
work studied labor market impacts at the MSA level and found little effect. In this paper,
we hypothesized that the lack of significant results could have been a product of the large
geographic scope. However, after estimating similar effects at the much narrower ZIP code
level, we still fail to find much in the way of convincing, positive results.
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The lack of positive results in the previous section seem to further foreshadow our initial
insignificant results when analyzing lower tier teams and arenas. It certainly seems as though
the prediction of nonexistent benefits from these arenas in Wirtz (2001) is more a reality
than a preconceived notion, as we initially thought. The only positive outlook given the lack
of results found here would be that we have estimated positive coefficients in our models, just
with a lack of significance. It is possible that the effects could be more precisely estimated
given a larger sample of arenas and more years of data.
3.7 Conclusion
The question of whether or not sports stadiums and arenas generate economic benefits
for local communities is certainly not a new one. For nearly 30 years, economists have
been analyzing sports facilities and attempting to measure what, if any, economic impact
they generate. Even with what seems like mounting evidence against any tangible, positive
benefits, the question continues to be posed time and time again. So, why is it that cities
and municipalities continue to support the construction of new stadiums and arenas with
the use of public funding? The answer may simply be that it was never really about the
numbers. A 2001 piece by Adam Zaretsky makes the observation that “the reasons...include
many intangible variables, such as civic pride and political self-interest. Moreover, cities
generally justify these decisions–and convince taxpayers of their virtue–with analyses that
many economists consider suspect because the studies generally overlook some basic economic
realities” (Zaretsky, 2001).
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The reality of our current sports environment in which fans are more passionate, diehard,
and loyal than ever is that no politician or decision maker wants to be seen as the reason
for a city’s favorite sports team packing up and leaving town in the middle of the night. As
much as citizens complain about the abuse of taxpayer funding used to construct new sports
facilities, it has not been enough to shift the balance of power away from the sports teams who
demand public funds. So, while most economic evidence to date, including this paper, fails
to find any meaningful impact that sports facilities have on local labor markets, it remains
unclear as to whether that will have any effect moving forward. It is likely that stadiums and
arenas will continue to be touted as vehicles of urban revitalization and economic growth by
politicians and supporters, while civic pride and the love of sports will prevent the economic
realities of the situation from having any impact.
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Fig. 3.1 Intrust Bank Arena - Wichita, KS (67202)
Fig. 3.2 Intrust Bank Arena - Wichita, KS (Sedgwick County)
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Table 3.2 Summary Statistics for Arena Sample
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Establishments 384 823.77 398.62 118.00 2214.00
Employment 384 14933.60 8242.71 819.00 41508.00
Annual Payroll ($000s) 384 604216.80 443239.80 18928.00 2023152.00
Average Annual Pay ($000s) 384 37.70 12.76 15.14 102.27
Arena (=1 if yes) 384 0.59 0.49 0.00 1.00
Table 3.3 Pre/Post Analysis Using Arena Sample
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Employment Annual Payroll Average Pay Establishments
Static Model
Arena 1,217 80,180* 1.399 68.12
(1,071) (40,987) (1.052) (54.20)
Observations 384 384 384 384
R-squared 0.821 0.884 0.906 0.823
Dynamic Model
Arena -640.2** -28,459** 0.151 -2.490
(326.6) (12,790) (0.665) (8.900)
L.Employment 0.932***
(0.0286)
L.AnnualPayroll 0.877***
(0.110)
L.AveragePay 0.586***
(0.104)
L.Establishments 0.928***
(0.0138)
Observations 336 336 336 336
Notes: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. ZIP code and time fixed effects are included
in both models, but not shown. Standard errors are in parentheses and are clustered
at the ZIP code level. There are 24 clusters used. Annual payroll and average pay are
reported in thousands of dollars ($000s).
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Table 3.5 Summary Statistics for Contiguous ZIP Code Sample
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Establishments 2,176 628.24 486.90 5.00 2,713.00
Employment 2,176 10,963.24 10,102.32 14.00 76,222.00
Annual Payroll ($000s) 2,176 433,398.90 525,784.40 291.00 5,493,521.00
Average Annual Pay ($000s) 2,176 34.65 10.99 7.17 102.27
Arena (=1 if yes) 2,176 0.10 0.31 0.00 1.00
Table 3.6 Contiguous ZIP Code Group Analysis
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Employment Annual Payroll Average Pay Establishments
Static Model
Arena 1,016 91,541** 2.292* 77.85
(1,226) (40,135) (1.199) (56.47)
Observations 2,176 2,176 2,176 2,176
R-squared 0.933 0.891 0.889 0.934
Dynamic Model
Arena -282.6 -1,455 0.948 -9.717**
(499.1) (24,310) (0.828) (4.942)
L.Employment 0.808***
(0.0897)
L.AnnualPayroll 0.945***
(0.0727)
L.AveragePay 0.464***
(0.0744)
L.Establishments 0.892***
(0.0159)
Observations 1,904 1,904 1,904 1,904
Notes: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. ZIP code fixed effects and group-specific
time fixed effects are included in both models, but not shown. Standard errors are in
parentheses and are clustered at the ZIP code group level. Annual payroll and average
annual pay are reported in thousands of dollars ($000s).
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Table 3.7 Contiguous ZIP Code Group Analysis - Variable Treatment
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Employment Annual Payroll Average Pay Establishments
Arena (t+1) -241.4 -10,930 0.0329 -12.51
(302.6) (21,048) (0.728) (9.401)
Arena (t+2) -112.3 -18,148 0.390 -5.116
(270.7) (17,821) (0.903) (8.400)
Arena (t+3) 275.5 20,263 1.188 4.354
(349.1) (13,311) (1.168) (6.950)
Arena (t+4) 76.94 -809.2 0.261 2.119
(317.2) (25,932) (0.842) (11.45)
Arena (t+5) -407.7 -11,731 0.980 1.547
(383.6) (26,249) (0.680) (4.435)
L.Employment 0.816***
(0.0806)
L.AnnualPayroll 0.945***
(0.0743)
L.AveragePay 0.469***
(0.0720)
L.Establishments 0.888***
(0.0154)
Observations 1,904 1,904 1,904 1,904
Notes: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. ZIP code fixed effects and group-specific
time fixed effects are included the model, but not shown. Standard errors are in
parentheses and are clustered at the ZIP code group level. Annual payroll and average
annual pay are reported in thousands of dollars ($000s).
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Table 3.8 Sample of NHL and NBA Arenas Built from 1998-2013
Location Arena Opened Capacity Primary Use
New York City, NY Barclays Center 2012 17,732 NBA, NHL
Orlando, FL Amway Center 2010 18,846 NBA
Pittsburgh, PA Consol Energy Center 2010 18,387 NHL
Newark, NJ Prudential Center 2007 17,625 NHL
Charlotte, NC Time Warner Cable Arena 2005 19,077 NBA
Memphis, TN FedExForum 2004 18,119 NBA
Houston, TX Toyota Center 2003 18,055 NBA
Glendale, AZ Gila River Arena 2003 17,125 NHL
Oklahoma City, OK Chesapeake Energy Arena 2002 18,203 NBA
San Antonio, TX AT&T Center 2002 18,418 NBA
Dallas, TX American Airlines Center 2001 19,200 NBA, NHL
Miami, FL American Airlines Arena 2000 19,600 NBA
Saint Paul, MN Xcel Energy Center 2000 17,954 NHL
Columbus, OH Nationwide Arena 2000 18,144 NHL
Los Angeles, CA Staples Center 1999 19,000 NBA, NHL
New Orleans, LA Smoothie King Center 1999 16,867 NBA
Atlanta, GA Philips Arena 1999 18,118 NBA
Denver, CO Pepsi Center 1999 19,155 NBA, NHL
Indianapolis, IN Bankers Life Fieldhouse 1999 18,165 NBA
Raleigh, NC PNC Arena 1999 18,680 NHL
Table 3.9 Summary Statistics for NHL/NBA Sample
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Establishments 1,904 871.18 615.05 28.00 3,371.00
Employment 1,904 18,305.31 16,189.69 223.00 92,855.00
Annual Payroll ($000s) 1,904 880,613.60 1,177,300.00 3,087.00 12,700,000.00
Average Pay ($000s) 1,904 41.04 15.60 13.60 140.25
Arena (=1 if yes) 1,904 0.12 0.32 0.00 1.00
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Table 3.11 Contiguous ZIP Code Group Analysis - NHL/NBA Arena Sample
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Employment Annual Payroll Average Pay Establishments
Static Model
Arena 211.9 431,224* 7.137*** -7.333
(1,352) (223,821) (2.414) (24.56)
Observations 1,904 1,904 1,904 1,904
R-squared 0.977 0.946 0.891 0.985
Dynamic Model
Arena -2,072 84,830 5.692*** 5.058
(1,279) (76,946) (1.504) (9.305)
L.Employment 0.541***
(0.110)
L.AnnualPayroll 0.920***
(0.0582)
L.AveragePay 0.759***
(0.0364)
L.Establishments 0.876***
(0.0562)
Observations 1,666 1,666 1,666 1,666
Notes: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. ZIP code fixed effects and group-specific
time fixed effects are included in both models, but not shown. Standard errors are in
parentheses and are clustered at the ZIP code group level. Annual payroll and average
annual pay are reported in thousands of dollars ($000s).
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Table 3.12 ZIP Code Group Analysis - NHL/NBA Arena Sample - Variable Treatment
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Employment Annual Payroll Average Pay Establishments
Arena (t+1) -374.1 -145,407 -1.021 36.33**
(864.3) (151,572) (1.712) (14.36)
Arena (t+2) 391.9 -88,010 -1.990 13.83
(526.5) (99,291) (1.794) (9.190)
Arena (t+3) 994.4 -21,649 -1.625 11.62
(649.8) (88,943) (1.121) (11.43)
Arena (t+4) 878.8 19,488 0.840 31.87**
(923.9) (65,069) (1.023) (15.80)
Arena (t+5) -493.8 -208,749** -1.464 12.28
(715.8) (101,638) (1.693) (12.34)
L.Employment 0.576***
(0.104)
L.AnnualPayroll 0.925***
(0.0434)
L.AveragePay 0.795***
(0.0421)
L.Establishments 0.866***
(0.0577)
Observations 1,666 1,666 1,666 1,666
Notes: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. ZIP code fixed effects and group-specific
time fixed effects are included in the model, but not shown. Standard errors are in
parentheses and are clustered at the ZIP code group level. Annual payroll and average
annual pay are reported in thousands of dollars ($000s).
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